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Message from the Editors 
 
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular 
Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary mission is 
twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare into the 
Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and second, to 
bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their 
knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-violent 
irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort at 
CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world-renowned academics, 
case studies, research papers, articles, and books. 
 It is important to note three critical caveats to this case study. First, 
the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author and do 
not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval War 
College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to correct 
any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible for the 
content of this case study. Third, the study questions presented in all 
CIWAG case studies are written to provoke discussion on a wide variety 
of topics including strategic, operational, and tactical matters as well as 
ethical and moral questions confronted by operators in the battlefield. The 
point is to make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive 
curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the 
challenges of the post-9/11 world and to show them the dilemmas that real 
people faced in high-pressure situations. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Through the 1980s, the United States involved itself in a civil war1 
in the smallest country on the mainland of the Americas. With a 
population roughly the equivalent of the Washington, D.C., metropolitan 
area and no clear geo-strategic benefit, El Salvador became an issue of 
constant concern at the highest levels of the U.S. government. U.S. 
President Ronald Reagan made televised addresses about El Salvador and 
spoke to a joint session of Congress about assistance to the tiny country. 
For a few years, only Israel and Egypt received more assistance. 
However, even with El Salvador prominent in the top tier of U.S. 
foreign policy concerns, a war going on there, and the United States 
committed to one side, we never had more than about 200 military 
personnel in that country on any given day. While the U.S. could have 
brought overwhelming force to bear, we put few boots on the ground. The 
U.S. military was nonetheless an indispensable element of U.S. policy. 
The other part of the story is that the Salvadoran government was 
dependent on the performance of a military that was profoundly flawed—
murderous, corrupt, and attached to its historical impunity. 
Although the Salvadoran conflict was a creation of the Cold War, 
it is not a historical oddity. Before and since, the United States has 
committed itself to a flawed ally. From Stalin through Diem and right on 
through to Karzai, our political leadership has repeatedly declared that one 
government or one cause is so important that we must find a way reform 
or tolerate or ignore the flaws of our friends. This is not always a bad thing. 
Winston Churchill was known for his staunch anti-Soviet views but 
offered assistance to Stalin’s government when Hitler invaded the Soviet 
Union. Asked about this seeming inconsistency, Churchill is said to have 
                                           
1 Neither the Government of El Salvador nor the United States referred to the conflict as a 
“civil war.” The Salvadorans did not wish to extend combatant status to the insurgents, 
and the U.S. has never described itself as participating in anyone else’s civil war. 
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responded, “If Hitler invaded hell, I would make at least a favorable 
reference to the devil in the House of Commons.” 
Nor was it the first time that the United States, with no apparent 
reason, declared a country or piece of territory of great value to national 
security. Consider Quemoy and Matsu. Given the age of serving military 
personnel, none of you may remember, but some of you may have read 
about it in a Cold War history or a study of the Kennedy-Nixon 
presidential race.2 When these conflicts are reviewed in subsequent 
decades, they can seem silly and wrong-headed. 
But while these incidents unfold, factors invisible in later years 
loom large. Few are possessed of the ability to understand the way the 
world will look in 40 years. Our national leaders are not specially blessed 
with foresight. Indeed, temporary political exigencies can narrow any 
politician’s viewpoint. One example may suffice. Lyndon Johnson 
mastered partisan politics and had a powerful sense of justice on racial 
matters.3 Additionally, he foresaw terrible problems in Vietnam. But he 
also saw that the Republicans would make problems for him if he pulled 
out.4 We know which fear prevailed. 
Please note: The viewpoint throughout this study is largely that of 
the U.S. executive branch.5 The viewpoints, aims, and ambitions of other 
                                           
2 These tiny islands in the Strait of Taiwan were heavily fortified by the Nationalist 
Chinese government in Taiwan, but were within artillery range of the People’s Republic 
of China. During the 1960 presidential race, Nixon accused Kennedy of being unwilling 
to commit to the use of nuclear weapons if Quemoy and Matsu were invaded by the 
People’s Republic of China. 
3 He predicted that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would drive the South into Republican 
hands. 
4 See “Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell, 
Washington, May 27, 1964, 10:55 p.m.,” U.S., Department of State, Office of the 
Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland 
Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs, Washington, DC, Document Number 52. 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam/lbjrr.htm 
5 Readers may rest assured the author knows that he hasn’t the moral or intellectual 
authority to speak for America. Even so, he will try to capture the main currents of 
thought at the time.  
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branches of government as well as those of other countries and 
organizations are referred to and assumed, but always from the viewpoint 
of the U.S. This is unavoidable, but if properly stated and understood, of 
value. Any use of whatever lessons may be taken from this study will all 
but certainly be undertaken in the same context.  
 
 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. Can the U.S. military carry out an extended mission if a vocal 
minority of the American people oppose it, a quieter minority 
supports it, and most Americans are indifferent to or unaware of it? 
2. Can our military prevail when its advantages in technology, 
maneuverability, firepower, communications, and mobility are 
irrelevant? 
3. What is the role of a warrior who is forbidden to engage in, or even 
go near, combat?  
4. How does “civilian control of the military” play out when the 
civilian controlling the military (the U.S. ambassador) is not in the 
White House, but in the same building? 
5. How do you, both as an individual and as part of a military 
organization, work with counterparts who are not just flawed, but 
criminal? 
6. How candid can you be, should you be, must you be in 
communicating matters to other agencies, the media, the public, 
that do not reflect public policy expressions from the highest 
levels? What about communicating facts that contradict official 
assertions? How can someone on the ground voice dissent? 
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II. A Moment in Time 
 
In 1976, Manuel Rodriguez, chief of staff of the Salvadoran Army, 
made a deal to sell $30 million in American-supplied arms and aircraft to 
two individuals he thought were members of the American Mafia. The two 
“buyers” were cops. Rodriguez was convicted and sentenced to five years 
in prison—even though the military high command in El Salvador (with 
the overwhelming approval of the entire officer corps) spent over 
$100,000 on his legal expenses.6  
Not long after taking office in January 1977, the Carter 
administration, citing egregious human rights abuses, ended military 
assistance to El Salvador. 
Four years later, with Rodriguez out of prison and back in El 
Salvador, the Carter administration resumed military assistance.  
What happened? 
In spite of El Salvador’s proximity7 to the United States, the U.S. 
had never taken much interest in the country. With only one coast, El 
Salvador could not be the site of an interoceanic canal. There was no oil or 
other extractable mineral. No United Fruit8 stood astride the economy. The 
coffee industry is globally disbursed and has never been vertically 
integrated, so El Salvador’s largest crop was never owned or dominated by 
foreign companies. Historically, El Salvador was not an outward-looking 
country in any but a commercial sense. Even when Farabundo Martí led 
the Western Hemisphere’s first avowedly communist uprising in 1932,9 
the broader world paid scant attention. 
                                           
6 Information about the officer corps’ support of official funds for Rodriguez’s defense 
told to the author by (then) Lt. Col. Carlos Avilés at a social function in 1984. 
7 As President Reagan often said, San Salvador (the capital) is closer to Houston than 
Houston is to Washington. 
8 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Fruit_Company. 
9 Agustín Farabundo Martí, once an assistant to Nicaragua’s Augusto Cesár Sandino, was 
a founder of the Communist Party of Central America and a leader in the uprising against 
Salvadoran dictator Maxmiliano Hernández Martinez. The uprising was crushed with 
 
HAMILTON: EL SALVADOR IN THE 1980s 
 
11 
 
At the beginning of the Carter administration (1977-1981): the 
United States had so little interest in El Salvador that, according to press 
accounts, the Central Intelligence Agency closed its station there and 
consolidated it into a regional one based elsewhere. 
The sudden and surprising collapse of the Somoza regime in 
neighboring (but not quite contiguous) Nicaragua changed that. For three 
generations, the Somoza family had run Nicaragua as a dictatorship happy 
to demonstrate its fealty to the United States.10 Following a brief armed 
rebellion, the Sandinista National Liberation Front overthrew Anastasio 
Somoza Debayle’s regime on July 19, 1979. The “Sandinista” part of the 
name came from Augusto Sandino, who had rebelled against a U.S. 
occupation of Nicaragua in 1927. Although the Carter administration tried 
hard to reach an amicable relationship with the new Sandinista 
government, it was always swimming upstream. The Sandinista anthem 
contained a line about the “Yankee enemies of humanity.” 
The Sandinista victory caused many to believe El Salvador would 
soon fall to the existing leftist insurgency—one closely tied to the 
Sandinistas. The abrupt collapse of the Somoza regime surprised left as 
well as right. In mid-1978, many thought the insurgency in El Salvador 
stronger than the Sandinistas. They were almost certainly richer. By 1978, 
the FMLN had accumulated a war chest of some $80 million. That made 
them rich enough to invest $10 million in the Nicaraguan revolution. They 
gave the money to the Sandinistas in Costa Rica—in cash.11 
On September 15, 1979, the Carter administration sent Assistant 
Secretary of State Viron P. Vaky to El Salvador to encourage Salvadoran 
                                                                                                         
about 30,000 people slaughtered. Hernandez had Martí shot after a perfunctory hearing. 
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farabundo_Mart%C3%AD. 
10 Franklin Roosevelt is supposed to have said of Somoza, “He may be a son-of-a-bitch, 
but he is our son-of-a-bitch.” The story may well be invented. He is supposed to have 
said the same thing of Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo. True or not, the quote 
endures because it seems to encapsulate U.S. attitudes toward Latin American dictators. 
11 James LeMoyne, “The Guerilla Network,” New York Times Magazine, April 6, 1986, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/06/magazine/the-guerrilla-network.html. 
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President Carlos Humberto Romero to call early elections as a means of 
preempting the insurgents. Romero refused. Everyone might have been 
better off had he followed the path Vaky suggested. 
A month later, on October 15, reformist military officers overthrew 
President Romero in a bloodless coup.12 They set up a military-civilian 
junta, the Revolucionario de Gobierno (Revolutionary Government Junta, 
or JRG). Reformist intentions notwithstanding, the various insurgent 
groups were not mollified and continued their fight. A disparate group of 
landowners, bankers, industrialists, and many military officers in El 
Salvador were furious. They believed the Carter administration, working 
with the JRG, was prepared to do to El Salvador exactly what they had 
done to Somoza’s Nicaragua—abandon it to the communists. 
While these events constitute the launching pad for a major 
conflict in El Salvador and all of Central America, it is not possible to 
comprehend U.S. involvement outside the context of world events and U.S. 
politics and U.S. public opinion. Ten years before or after, events in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua would almost certainly have brought a very 
different response from any U.S. administration. 
In the United States, the national mood was sour. At one point 
President Jimmy Carter gave what came to be called the “malaise 
speech.”13 The Boston Globe prepared an editorial about the speech with a 
title along the lines of “Let Us All Pull Together.” Someone at the Globe 
inserted a new headline: “Mush from the Wimp.” A swath of the 
population was delighted with the headline. How did our national mood 
become so sour? Consider the approximately five years that ended the 
1970s: 
                                           
12 Some have wondered if the U.S. engineered the October 1979 coup. In a sense, it did 
not matter if the U.S. reached out to the golpistas (Spanish for “coup makers”). The fact 
of the Vaky visit and knowledge of his message would have been understood as a 
message: “The U.S. is through with Romero and with 50 years of military presidents.”  
13 He never used the word “malaise.” 
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 President Richard M. Nixon had resigned when it became clear 
that he would be convicted of “high crimes and misdemeanors” if 
he tried to remain in office. 
 We left Vietnam in defeat, panic, and disorder. When our 
ambassador helicoptered off the U.S. embassy roof with our flag 
under his arm, he left behind untold thousands of Vietnamese who 
had trusted us. A few lucky Vietnamese loaded their helicopters 
with their families and flew offshore to U.S. carriers. The carriers 
had no place to put the helicopters, so carrier crews pushed the 
helicopters into the sea. It made for gripping television. Others 
crowded on to boats and barges and hoped for refuge. 
 Oil shocks in 1972 and again in 1979 had run energy prices 
through the roof. Lining up for gasoline shocked Americans. As an 
energy-saving measure, the lights on the Capitol Dome and 
Washington Monument were turned off late at night. 
 Following peaceful negotiations, the United States negotiated and 
signed a treaty that would eventually turn “our canal” over to 
Panama. 
 Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, who described the United States as the 
“Great Satan,” led mobs that toppled our friend, the Shah. “Student” 
supporters overran the U.S. embassy in Teheran and held our 
diplomats hostage.14  
 Just 17 days after our embassy in Teheran was seized, a mob in 
Islamabad burned our embassy there to the ground and killed a 
Marine Security Guard and an Army warrant officer.15 
                                           
14 In 1980, a bollixed military rescue ended in blood and flames in the desert. Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance resigned in protest at President Carter’s decision to launch the rescue. 
Vance stayed in office to avoid hinting that something was afoot, but he was careful to 
make it clear at the time that he would leave regardless of the outcome. His view, roughly 
stated, was that this was such a bad idea that it did not matter if it succeeded. 
15 The proximate cause of the rioting (to which the Pakistani authorities seemed to be 
deliberately slow to respond) was the violent occupation of the Great Mosque in Mecca. 
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 Anti-government forces kidnapped the U.S. ambassador in Kabul, 
Adolf “Spike” Dubs. At the direction of Soviet advisers and over 
U.S. objections, the Afghan government launched an assault that 
killed Ambassador Dubs. 
 The Soviets launched a full-scale invasion and occupation of 
Afghanistan. 
 In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas threw out the thuggish but pro-U.S. 
Somoza family. The Sandinistas were cozy with Havana. 
 The prime rate was about 15%; the “misery index” (unemployment 
rate plus inflation rate) was over 20%. 
 
The United States had emerged from World War II as the richest, 
most powerful, and most respected nation in history. How had we come to 
this in one lifetime?  
It is commonplace to attribute President Carter’s 1980 electoral 
loss to the Iran hostage crisis. But the broader sense that many things had 
gone terribly wrong came well before and then ran parallel to the hostage 
crisis. The Carter administration had always faced an uphill battle. By the 
1970s, the states west of the Mississippi were enough by themselves to 
win in the Electoral College. In 1976, Gerald Ford carried every state west 
of the Mississippi except Texas and California.  
In light of national and international events, there was no reason to 
assume any state that went for Ford would vote for Carter. Nor did anyone 
believe Carter could keep Texas and California out of the hands of Ronald 
Reagan.  
Running on a time-for-a-change platform, Ronald Reagan’s 
overwhelming victory gave him a mandate for a frankly assertive foreign 
policy, a policy that turned out to be not so much aggressive as defiant. 
                                                                                                         
The rumor sweeping through Pakistan was that the occupation was the work of the 
Israelis. Ironically, the Muslim extremists who took over the mosque evolved into al 
Qaida.  
HAMILTON: EL SALVADOR IN THE 1980s 
 
15 
 
Central America was close to home and there was little doubt of 
communist involvement. The prospect of something like another Cuba 
close to our borders was a logical place to show this defiance. 
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III. The Carter Administration 
 
Before the 1979 coup, the Carter administration had cut off all 
military assistance to El Salvador16 because of human rights abuses. But 
with the coming of land reform17 in March of 1980 and the advent of a 
second, completely civilian, junta,18 the U.S. began a $6 million program 
of military assistance.  
As these events occurred, Salvador exploded into civil war. The 
insurgency never stopped and its support from Cuba, overwhelmingly 
moving through Nicaragua after mid-1979, continued. Many of those 
whose land had been confiscated for agrarian reform (commonly called los 
afectados—the “affected ones”) became death squad supporters. Some 
gave only emotional support, sympathy, or tolerance; other afectados gave 
direction, money, and political and public relations support. The right-
wing opponents of the junta coalesced around Roberto D’Aubuisson, a 
former major in the Salvadoran Armed Forces. Short and slender, 
D’Aubuisson nevertheless brought a vibrant (and violent) speaking style 
and considerable charisma to the conservative cause. 
As the guerrillas pursued more-or-less common urban guerrilla 
tactics such as kidnappings for ransom, robberies, Molotov cocktail 
attacks, and selective assassinations, the right responded with death 
squads.19 
                                           
16 As well as Guatemala and Argentina. 
17 Designed in great part with assistance from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and the AFL-CIO’s Latin American arm, the American Institute of Free 
Labor Development (AIFLD). 
18 The first mixed civilian and military junta collapsed with the resignation of all its 
civilian members. All civilian cabinet members also resigned. 
19 “Death squad” is an elusive term, but usually refers to police or soldiers committing 
murders while operating with no lawful authority or acknowledged chain of command. In 
El Salvador, most death squads consisted of soldiers or police operating under the 
instructions of their officers. The officers may or may not have received instructions from 
their legitimate chain of command. Selected officers may have been responding to 
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This put the Carter administration in a bad place. 
After having attempted to move Somoza out using “interference 
without intervention,”20 the administration tried to propitiate the 
Sandinistas. They gave an immediate $15 million grant for reconstruction 
and pushed another $75 million through Congress. In September 1979, the 
president invited the nine-member Sandinista directorate to the White 
House. This pattern of embracing almost any group that replaces a tyranny 
is a recurrent theme for the U.S. Iraq, Egypt, and Libya come immediately 
to mind. Fear of doing this again is a major factor in our delicacy in the 
continuing21 Syrian civil war. 
Through 1979 and into 1980, relations with the Sandinistas 
deteriorated. In El Salvador, chaos and bloodshed accelerated. 
The Salvadoran Catholic Church became prominent in the war and 
remained so throughout. In February 1980, Salvadoran Archbishop Óscar 
Romero wrote to President Carter and asked that the president not increase 
military aid to the Salvadoran junta. Romero said such aid would 
“undoubtedly sharpen the injustice and the political repression inflicted on 
the organized people, whose struggle has often been for their most basic 
human rights.” 
On March 23, 1980, the Archbishop’s sermon included a call to 
Salvadoran soldiers: 
 
I want to make a special appeal to soldiers, National Guardsmen, 
and policemen: each of you is one of us. The peasants you kill are 
your own brothers and sisters. When you hear a man telling you 
to kill, remember God’s words, “thou shalt not kill.” No soldier is 
obliged to obey a law contrary to the law of God. In the name of 
                                                                                                         
instructions from former military personnel or wealthy patrons from as far away as 
Miami. 
20 That is the description applied by Mauricio Solaún, President Carter’s final ambassador 
to Nicaragua, in a conversation with the author in San Salvador in 1986. 
21 As of spring 2014. 
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God, in the name of our tormented people, I beseech you, I 
implore you; in the name of God I command you to stop the 
repression.22 
 
Archbishop Romero was assassinated the next day while saying 
mass in a hospital chapel, slain by a single rifle shot. D’Aubuisson was 
immediately and widely considered to be responsible for his murder.23 The 
Archbishop’s funeral drew a huge crowd, but it was broken up when 
government forces fired automatic weapons into the mourners.24 Video of 
the panicked crowd made an important impression in the U.S. 
By May 1980, the disparate bands of armed groups confronting the 
Salvadoran government came together after Fidel Castro brought them to 
Havana and insisted they unite. They became the Unified Revolutionary 
Directorate, but the only thing that really mattered was their military 
organization, Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (Farabundo 
Marti National Liberation Front): invariably shortened in English and 
Spanish to FMLN. 
That same month D’Aubuisson was arrested and momentarily 
jailed in San Salvador. Perhaps to 300 demonstrators blaming the U.S. for 
the arrest blockaded the residence of U.S. Ambassador Robert White. 
They shouted slogans and waved placards such as “Down with Human 
Rights!” “Long Live Reagan!” “Carter is a Commie!” and “White is Red!” 
Eventually, the embassy’s Marine Security Guards dispersed the 
                                           
22 Romero, Archbishop Oscar, “The Last Sermon,” 
http://www.haverford.edu/relg/faculty/amcguire/romero.html 
23 The UN Truth Commission for El Salvador later substantiated this, finding that “Major 
Roberto D’Aubuisson gave the order to assassinate the Archbishop.” See “D. Death 
Squad Assassinations,” Report of the UN Truth Commission on El Salvador, English p. 
127, March 15, 1993, http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html 
24 The Salvadoran Armed Forces said the armed left killed the demonstrators/mourners. 
The consensus among responsible analysts is that the FMLN set off some leaflet bombs 
or other demonstration explosions. After the explosions, the government forces opened 
fire. 
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demonstrators with tear gas grenades so the ambassador could go to the 
embassy. Death squad killings continued to grow before reaching a 
monthly toll of 750 in October 1980.25 
Rightist opposition to the (second) junta and U.S. involvement was 
strong and growing stronger throughout this period. The leftist opposition 
also opposed the junta and U.S. involvement. The U.S. Embassy in San 
Salvador was machine-gunned, rocketed, or otherwise attacked about 20 
times in 1980. Only one of the attacks on the embassy had the potential for 
major casualties: One afternoon, an RPG came through the window next 
to the ambassador’s office. Although one must suppose the ambassador 
was the intended target (he was not in the embassy): the rocket actually 
penetrated the ambassador’s conference room where the country team met 
several times weekly. The ambassador’s conference room was moved to 
the basement, but his office stayed on the third floor. None of the attackers 
was definitively identified individually or by organization. 
These attacks on the embassy and the picketing at the 
ambassador’s residence are noteworthy only for their frequency and 
presumed rightist origin. Throughout the Cold War and especially after the 
U.S. entered Vietnam in force, U.S. embassies were common targets for 
demonstrations, vandalism, and occasional violent attacks. While 
American diplomats, especially ambassadors, were and are frequent 
targets of terrorists, massive violence intended to kill large numbers of 
people at American embassies really did not start until the bombing of the 
U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983.26  
                                           
25 The count of death squad victims was neither accurate nor official. The U.S. embassy’s 
human rights office attempted to compile numbers based on press reports but freely 
acknowledged the defects of its own system. Most of the “death squad victims” were 
merely described as having been “found dead.” The embassy noted that the method all 
but certainly undercounted deaths in rural areas and also recorded deaths from ordinary 
criminality as “death squad killings.” 
26 “Terrorism” has defied definition in international forums. One of the few and one of 
the first agreed-upon was that attacks on embassy personnel are terrorism because they 
are “internationally protected persons.” While the United Nations has never achieved a 
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In this context, neither the American people nor their government 
became alarmed about the attacks on the embassy. The State Department 
sent dependents home and made San Salvador an unaccompanied tour for 
personnel of all agencies. Diplomatic Security changed the iron-barred 
fence to a concrete wall and placed sandbags and armor plates around and 
partially covering the windows. Diplomatic Security also instituted 
aggressive, roving armed patrols around the embassy. Anyone 
photographing the embassy or loitering was braced and asked to identify 
himself. Journalists with ID were permitted to photograph, but were asked 
to call ahead in the future. 
 
Examining the options:  
 Did the Carter administration handle the deteriorating security 
situation properly? 
 What were other options were available? 
 Why not just walk away? Some countries, including the Israelis 
and the Japanese, closed their embassies, wished the Salvadoran 
government well, and went home. 
 Alternately, instead of adding a small number of Marine Security 
Guards, why not bring in several dozen to show resolve? 
                                                                                                         
broad definition of terrorism, UN diplomats quickly reached agreement that attacks on 
diplomats were forbidden “under all circumstances.” Terrorism itself has changed 
dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The State Department’s annual publication 
“Patterns of Global Terrorism” (now called “Country Reports on Terrorism”) always 
showed that the greatest number of terrorist attacks on U.S. interests took place in Latin 
America—but these attacks seldom caused casualties. Indeed, until the 1990s, most 
terrorist incidents were property crimes such as small bombs placed outside empty 
buildings. Most of the time, the purpose was to attract attention, to create “propaganda by 
the deed.” At the end of the 1990s, the number of terrorist attacks was down dramatically 
but the death count was going up. With the rise of mass-casualty terrorism and 
devastating attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi and on the UN 
compound in Iraq, petty attacks and vandalism against embassies seems to have 
diminished. 
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 What should the U.S. do today when an administration sends an 
embassy to a very dangerous place with no U.S. combat forces in 
country?27  
  
                                           
27 It happens more often than you think. Since 1945, more American ambassadors than 
American generals have been killed by hostile action. 
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IV. The Interregnum 
 
No one familiar with El Salvador was surprised that Salvadoran 
conservatives preferred Ronald Reagan in the 1980 U.S. elections. 
Virtually all well-to-do Salvadorans believed that the troubles afflicting 
their country should be charged to Jimmy Carter’s account. Even so, 
American diplomats who had been abroad during many U.S. elections did 
not expect the extensive celebratory gunfire in San Salvador’s better 
neighborhoods when it became clear that Reagan had won.  
That gunfire signaled a changed dynamic in El Salvador. Those 
actively opposing the rebels had feared the Carter administration would 
leave them to the mercy of the communists. Now they were confident that 
a Reagan administration would set aside the Carter human rights policy, 
which they believed prevented progress against the communists. Reagan, 
they said and believed, would get down to the serious business of stopping 
communist aggression. Left and right in El Salvador shared one belief: A 
Reagan administration would stand against the rebels—no matter what. 
Death squad killings dropped quickly and never returned to the 
October 1980 level. But if the number of systematic murders fell, the 
victims’ profile soared. Between the election and the inauguration of 
Ronald Reagan, the following events occurred: 
 
 As soon as it became clear that Reagan would win, Americans 
claiming to have influence with the new administration began 
visiting El Salvador. They met with prominent members of the 
business community, right-wing politicians, and others unknown. 
These self-proclaimed envoys of the incoming administration 
promised big changes in U.S. policy, including a house cleaning at 
the Department of State and the immediate departure of 
Ambassador White. People serving at the embassy at the time do 
not recall any of these individuals securing positions in the Reagan 
administration, but some already were or became staffers on 
HAMILTON: EL SALVADOR IN THE 1980s 
 
23 
 
Capitol Hill. Several people assigned to the embassy at the time 
told the author that the visitors’ Salvadoran contacts came to 
believe that the Reagan administration would be uninterested in 
human rights and that the administration would not be curious 
about how the left was to be defeated.  
 On November 28, “heavily armed men dressed in civilian 
clothes”28 kidnapped six leaders of the Democratic Revolutionary 
Front (generally known by its Spanish initials FDR) from a 
meeting in San Salvador. The FDR was an organization of 
socialists who believed in democracy and had not taken up arms. 
They were tortured and murdered the same day, and their bodies 
were dumped in the streets of the capital. 
 On December 2, two American nuns who were resident in El 
Salvador but visiting Managua returned to attend a memorial 
service for the FDR leaders. Another American nun and a female 
American lay worker went to the airport to pick them up. Shortly 
after they left the airport, all four were intercepted by a group of 
Salvadoran National Guardsmen. The Guardsmen murdered them 
all and burned their van. The Guardsmen probably raped them as 
well, but the forensic tests necessary to prove this were never run. 
 On December 28, American freelance journalist John J. Sullivan 
arrived in El Salvador and checked into the Sheraton Hotel. About 
two hours later, he went out for a walk and disappeared. Foul play 
was assumed from the start, but his body was not discovered for 
some 18 months. The New York-based Committee to Protect 
Journalists later received highly credible and specific information 
that the Treasury Police had picked Sullivan up off the street, 
tortured, and murdered him. They chopped off his hands and put a 
                                           
28 The phrase “heavily armed men dressed in civilian clothes” was a euphemism that 
Salvadoran newspapers and radio used at the time. It really meant “military personnel not 
in uniform.” 
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grenade in his mouth to make identification difficult. It seems the 
Treasury Police had mistaken Sullivan for a rebel collaborator to 
whom he bore a slight resemblance.29  
 On January 3, 1981, two Salvadoran National Guardsmen, 
operating on orders and under threat, murdered Michael Hammer 
and Mark Pearlman, two Americans working for the American 
Institute of Free Labor Development. They also murdered Rodolfo 
Viera, the head of the Salvadoran Agrarian Reform Institute. The 
victims were just finishing dinner in the Sheraton Hotel when the 
Guardsmen opened fire with Ingram machine pistols. The 
commanders of the Guardsmen and prominent civilian friends of 
the officers were present at the hotel at the time.30  
 On January 5, a respected Salvadoran lawyer, well and favorably 
known to the U.S. Embassy, told Chargé d’ Affaires, a.i.31 Mark 
Dion that a gang of six Salvadorans living in Miami were behind 
most death squad activity. As Dion reported in a NODIS cable,32 
these six men had bribed military and government officials in El 
                                           
29 This author worked closely with the Committee to Protect’s executive director Anne 
Nelson when she came to San Salvador in an effort to meet the unnamed author of the 
letter containing this information. Ms. Nelson and I both thought the letter was authentic, 
or was at least written by someone who had access to accurate information. The letter 
described Sullivan very well and stated the approximate amount of money he was 
carrying, as well as the brand of his camera. I worked with Nelson and the Embassy 
Regional Security Office to set up a meeting with the letter writer at a location that could 
be watched and where an armed response would be possible were she to be threatened. 
No one showed up for the meeting, and I am not aware that the author was ever identified. 
In the letter, he said he was a corporal in the Treasury Police.  
30 This event is discussed in detail below. 
31 “Chargé d’Affaires, a.i.” translates from the French as “In charge of business in the 
interim.” The embassy has only two positions with duties related to all activities of all 
agencies, the ambassador and his number two, the deputy chief of mission (DCM). When 
the ambassador is out of the country for any reason, the DCM automatically becomes 
Chargé. 
32 NODIS is an exceptionally narrow diplomatic channel. The cable is dated 1981 San 
Salvador 0096, 6 January 1981; declassified and released, July 12, 2006. 
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Salvador. Their aim was to “destabilize the country and overthrow 
the junta, and using their tactics, bombing factories and offices, 
kidnaping businessmen … The object is to terrorize those who are 
still working for a moderate outcome … and impose a rightist 
dictatorship.” According to Dion’s report, the grand plan was to 
wreck the economy and bring to power a “good military officer 
who will carry out a total cleansing, killing three or four or five 
hundred thousand people, whatever it takes to get rid of all the 
communists and their allies.” Then the country could be 
reconstructed on a new foundation with property rights secured 
forever. Dion closed his cable with a plea for Washington to do 
something about the fact that all this was taking place “in a major 
American city.” Dion’s cable had no discernable effect. Most of 
the individuals named continued to live in Miami. 
 On January 10, 1981, the FMLN announced its “final offensive.” 
Their aim most likely was to establish operational control over the 
Department of Morazán in the far northeast of the country. The 
FMLN believed they would spark a widespread uprising and, by 
declaring the northeast a “liberated zone,” secure international 
recognition. The mass uprising did not materialize and the final 
offensive fizzled. 
 As incontrovertible evidence came in that Nicaragua was 
supporting the FMLN with arms, and with only days remaining in 
office, the Carter administration found itself astride a dilemma:  
 On the one hand, they faced a Salvadoran government whose 
forces were involved in wholesale and egregious human rights 
abuses; these forces had murdered American citizens and were 
barely pretending to carry out investigations of the murders.  
 On the other, it was no longer possible to believe this was a purely 
internal Salvadoran issue. Arms smuggled from Nicaragua into El 
Salvador were fueling the “final offensive.” 
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Figuratively on his way out the door, President Carter signed the 
finding that again permitted military assistance to El Salvador.  
It was Reagan’s problem now. 
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V. The Reagan Administration 
 
Just as Ronald Reagan took the oath of office, the hostages from 
the U.S. embassy in Tehran left Iranian airspace. Although it was the 
Iranians who had timed this to inflict maximum humiliation on President 
Carter, it almost seemed that the sunny, optimistic President Reagan had 
made it happen.  
The embrace of El Salvador’s junta was not an inescapable priority 
for Congress or the public. The Reagan administration chose to make it so. 
Yes, El Salvador was nearby, but the purely military case was hard to 
make. The administration effectively made El Salvador the global symbol 
of America leading the West, stopping or even rolling back communist 
totalitarians. 
Since the Iron Curtain descended, the right-most elements of the 
Republican Party had denounced the actions of presidents Franklin 
Roosevelt and Harry Truman and their administrations as sell-outs to the 
Soviet Union and communism. To many, the subsequent gains of the 
communists in China, Cuba, and most recently Vietnam showed 
communism advancing inexorably. They saw an obvious line from Yalta 
to San Salvador. 
The foreign policy team, headed by National Security Advisor 
Richard V. Allen, considered Carter’s foreign policy a failure on its face 
and intended to change things quickly. Secretary of State Al Haig spoke of 
“drawing a line in the sand” and “going to the source” (i.e., Cuba).33  
The overall view of the Reagan administration can be gleaned by 
the following excerpts from talking points sent by National Security 
Council staffers Alfonso Sapia-Bosch and Oliver North to National 
                                           
33 Haig frequently used this term. The meaning was the Cuba was the source of 
revolutionary activity in Latin America. See “Why U.S. Has Cuba Jitters,” Christian 
Science Monitor, Nov. 18, 1981, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/1118/111835.html/%28page%29/2. 
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Security Advisor William P. Clark on April 13, 1983.34 The points were 
intended for Clark to use in his effort to persuade U.S. Representative 
Edward P. Boland (D-MA) to revise pending legislation so as to permit 
funding for the Nicaraguan contras: 
We have not added to instability in the region. The Nicaraguans 
began their activities shortly after assuming power in July 1979. 
Had the U.S. not become involved, we would have already lost El 
Salvador; Honduras would be on the way; and Guatemala would 
be next. … 
 If we withdraw our support from the Contras now, we stand to 
destroy the credibility we have been rebuilding since Vietnam. 
Not only will we be accused of standing in the way of freedom, 
liberty, and democracy, but the Soviets and the Cubans will have 
new opportunities to step up their involvement in the area. This 
fact will not be missed on [sic] those in the Mideast and NATO, 
who are watching this situation closely as a measure of U.S. 
resolve and commitment. 
 
A. Personnel Initiative  
 
The first order of business was to get Carter administration 
holdovers out of the way. Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White was 
removed almost immediately. All the Latin America staffers on the 
National Security Council were removed, and no Foreign Service officers 
were named to replace them.35 Several officers in the Office of Central 
American Affairs at the State Department were reassigned. The new Latin 
America team was headed by Assistant Secretary of State for 
Interamerican Affairs Thomas O. Enders, a career officer who had never 
                                           
34 Declassified July 25, 2013. 
35 Many in the Reagan administration, especially on the National Security Council staff, 
considered Foreign Service officers to be unreliable liberals until proven otherwise. 
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served in Latin America and spoke no Spanish. State’s new director of 
Central American Affairs, L. Craig Johnstone, was new to the region, 
having previously served in Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. 
Within days of White’s removal, the administration dispatched 
Fredric L. Chapin (who had been on detail to the Department of Defense) 
as Chargé d’Affaires in El Salvador.36 Two weeks later, they nominated 
Senior Foreign Service Officer Deane R. Hinton, who had served on the 
National Security Council staff during the Nixon administration and who 
had previously served as ambassador to Zaire and as assistant secretary of 
state for economic and business affairs. 
 
B. Military and Diplomatic Initiatives 
 
Military teams were dispatched to El Salvador almost immediately. 
Their purpose was to determine the scope and priority for assistance. The 
Reagan administration understood that military assistance was an urgent 
necessity; but also knew full well that military assistance alone would be 
insufficient.  
On February 17, 1981, four weeks to the day after the 
administration took office, Secretary of State Alexander Haig briefed the 
ambassadors of the NATO countries plus Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 
and Spain. 
Following are some excerpts from that briefing:37 
 
A well-orchestrated international Communist campaign 
designed to transform the Salvadoran crisis from the internal 
conflict to an increasingly internationalized confrontation is under 
                                           
36 This was understood to be temporary. White had been relieved and a new ambassador 
would have to gain Senate concurrence. A Chargé does not require Senate approval. 
37 The following material appeared in the New York Times on 21 January 1981. The fact 
that the extended excerpts are verbatim and include off-the-record material indicates that 
this was almost certainly an “authorized leak.” 
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way. With Cuban coordination, the Soviet bloc, Vietnam, Ethiopia, 
and radical Arabs are furnishing at least several hundred tons of 
military equipment to the Salvadoran leftist insurgents. Most of 
this equipment, not all but most, has entered via Nicaragua, and 
this morning we will be briefing you in some detail on the 
intelligence we have gathered and which we consider irrefutable.  
I want to emphasize that the Government in El Salvador is 
a coalition, headed by a true Christian Democrat, Napoleon Duarte. 
It includes moderate military and independent civilians.  
I also want to emphasize and know you are aware that El 
Salvador and its Government have been plagued by dissension. 
Nevertheless, despite terrorist attacks from both left and right, it 
has proceeded with a reform program and does offer some hope for 
the future. … 
The extreme left has thus far failed to topple the existing 
Government in El Salvador. The revolutionaries' recent large 
military operation has failed. We have also seen the dwindling 
support in the popular sector for the revolutionaries. The left is 
increasingly under Marxist domination and Cuban influence, and it 
has clearly opted for a military solution. The Communist nations 
intervened in 1980 to provide the insurgents with large amounts of 
military supplies, and we have evidence outlining this in detail, 
which we will give you this morning.  
During the first weeks of this administration we have taken 
a number of steps to deal with this situation. After, and only after, 
the external intervention, we furnished the Salvadoran Government 
the additional military assistance it urgently needs to meet the 
threat of the Cuban-supported guerrillas. There were no lethal 
military supplies before that—none—until large-scale military 
attacks had been executed. We are also continuing to disburse the 
$63 million in fiscal year 1981 economic aid which was already 
programmed for El Salvador, and we are now conducting an 
extensive interagency study to determine what additional support 
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may be necessary in the near future. We will be consulting further 
with you from time to time on this. We believe additional help is 
needed. … 
The Communist countries are orchestrating an intensive 
international disinformation campaign to cover their intervention 
while discrediting the Salvadoran Government and American 
support for that Government.  
As most of you know, we are sending representatives to 
Europe and Latin America to present the evidence of a Communist 
involvement and to seek support and understanding for our actions. 
Over the next few weeks I will be meeting with key foreign 
leaders, as they visit Washington, to discuss the issue in greater 
detail.  
Our most urgent objective is to stop the large flow of arms 
through Nicaragua into El Salvador. We consider what is 
happening is part of the global Communist campaign coordinated 
by Havana and Moscow to support the Marxist guerrillas in El 
Salvador.  
The policy implications are already clear: First, the U.S.G. 
[United States Government] supports and will continue to support 
the present Government in El Salvador. We intend to work with 
that Government with the objective of achieving social justice and 
stability in that strife-torn country.  
Second, the U.S.G. is convinced that neither stability nor 
social justice in El Salvador is possible as long as Communist 
subversion continues.  
Third, we will not remain passive in the face of this 
Communist challenge, a systematic, well-financed, sophisticated 
effort to impose a Communist regime in Central America.  
This effort involves close coordination by Moscow, 
satellite capitals and Havana, with the cooperation of Hanoi and 
Managua. It is a repetition of the pattern we have already seen in 
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Angola and Ethiopia, and, I may add, elsewhere. It is a threat, in 
our view, not just to the United States but to the West at large.  
We have not yet decided on the precise steps we will take 
to deal with the situation; we will, however, in some way have to 
deal with the immediate source of the problem—and that is Cuba.  
Off the record, I wish to assure you we do not intend to 
have another Vietnam and engage ourselves in another bloody 
conflict where the source rests outside the target area.  
We believe in all sincerity we have no alternative but to act 
to prevent forces hostile to the U.S. and the West from 
overthrowing a government on our doorstep, particularly when that 
government offers the best hope of progress toward moderate 
democracy.  
 
Q. Will a copy of this briefing be made available to us?  
A. Not at the moment. We are in a consulting phase with many of 
your governments and the bipartisan leadership in Congress. We 
are faced with a four-legged stool:  
One leg is what we should do in manifesting support of and 
encouraging reform in El Salvador.  
The second leg is the problem of Nicaragua and the urgent 
need to put an end to the illicit arms traffic to El Salvador from 
Nicaragua—a country which has received millions of dollars in 
U.S. economic support.  
The third leg I would call the external disinformation 
campaign designed to paint the revolutionary effort as distinctively 
apart from outside interventionist activity.  
The fourth leg is the problem of Cuba. We do not anticipate 
dealing with that situation in the historic sense of what we did in 
Vietnam. We are studying a number of alternatives. I have nothing 
further to add on this except to assure you that we see happening 
here in El Salvador what happened in Africa and Southwest Asia—
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and that is dangerous not only for the U.S. but for all nations that 
share our values.  
Obviously the purpose of this briefing is to share with you 
the facts we have uncovered. As you know, it has been my strong 
belief that we cannot hope to consult and coordinate unless we 
have the same basis of facts. Thus I hope that your governments 
would consider these facts and that they would not do anything 
against what the U.S. is trying to do until they had looked at this 
information.  
Q. You said that you would not repeat Vietnam, that you would get 
at the source of the problem. Could you elaborate?  
A. Only to emphasize that we are studying various sources of 
information. I would not want your reporting to show our position 
as overly dramatic.  
Q. Has Moscow been apprised of your concern?  
A. I think you know there have been exchanges. Yes, there have 
been a number of exchanges with Ambassador Dobrynin. There 
has also been—I say it because it has been in the press—with 
Gromyko. There is a growing concern over Soviet risk-taking. 
There is concern over the situation in Poland.38  
Q. You did not mention the adjacent countries.  
A. We have, for example, conveyed to the Government of Panama 
the information conveyed in this briefing, but without the same 
degree of specificity. I know that these governments are aware of 
our increasing concern about intervention—above all, Cuban.  
Q. Is there a time deadline?  
A. No, and I think it most appropriate that there not be. I think you 
are aware of the provision of the U.S. law, which is relevant to the 
case of Nicaragua, that countries that engage in external 
                                           
38 At the time Haig was speaking, the Solidarity movement was beginning to make a 
serious, concerted challenge to communist rule. –D.H. 
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intervention must lose U.S. economic assistance and even must 
pay back what has been already provided. We have brought this to 
the attention of the Nicaraguans and given them time to consider. 
They have assured us they would stop infiltration, but given past 
history we are skeptical.  
Q. What is the balance between the guerrillas and the 
Government?  
A. The guerrillas have not achieved public support. There is a hard 
core of 4,000, about a quarter of the strength of Salvador's security 
force. The effort to overthrow the regime in January was a failure.  
Now the guerrillas are in nodes of resistance around the 
country, including in selective assassination of Government 
officials. The situation is under reasonable control, but there is 
always the possibility of further external intervention along the 
lines of what happened in Ethiopia.39 And there is also the 
possibility of Nicaraguan intervention. 
 
C. A Legislative Offensive 
 
Congressional support was essential for the most basic of all 
reasons. For the executive branch to work on any problem requires that 
any administration have two things that only Congress can provide. The 
first is authorization to conduct an activity. Authorizations are generally 
broad, but every activity must be authorized and the authorizing 
committee(s) can shut down almost any program. The key authorizing 
committees for El Salvador were the same as for most international 
activities: foreign affairs/foreign relations, armed services, and 
intelligence.  
The second, and perhaps even more important, is an appropriation. 
The appropriations committees dole out money to the various departments 
                                           
39 In 1977, Cuba, with Soviet backing, put thousands of Cuban troops in Ethiopia. – D.H. 
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of government. They can use their constitutional power40 to control federal 
policies and practices in as much detail as they wish. For example, they 
could say something like “no funds made available under this 
appropriation shall be used to arm, equip, train, or otherwise assist the 
police or armed forces of El Salvador.” 
 
D. A Public Affairs Offensive  
 
Understandably, many Reagan administration officials were in the 
news. They blanketed the (then) three major networks and CNN. Secretary 
of State Haig was the most prominent, but none left anyone doubting that 
El Salvador was the administration’s number-one foreign policy priority. 
While the Reagan administration moved quickly on the diplomatic, 
military (assistance): and political/congressional fronts, the 
political/congressional piece could not be sustained without the support of 
the American people.41 Here, the left was way out front. Salvadoran Farid 
Handal founded the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El 
Salvador, better known as CISPES,42 while he was touring the U.S. to 
drum up opposition to Carter administration support for the junta. Farid 
Handal is the brother of Schafik Handal. Schafik was the head of the 
Communist Party of El Salvador and led it into armed opposition and 
participation in the Unified Revolutionary Directorate, which under 
Castro’s tutelage became the FMLN. 
                                           
40 (art. I. § 9) says: “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of 
appropriations made by law.” 
41 This is more than junior-high civics. If the American people will not support, or at least 
acquiesce to, a program, it will lose funding.  
42 It is hard to document Farid Handal as the founder, but there is no doubt that Handal 
was in the U.S. at the time CISPES was founded. 
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Fueled by outrages such as the murder of Archbishop Romero and 
the American nuns,43 CISPES chapters opened in many cities around the 
U.S. The CISPES chapters became a potent (but not overwhelming) force. 
They vociferously opposed support for the Salvadoran government and 
carried out classic protests, such as occupying the Chicago office of 
Illinois Senator Charles Percy. CISPES chapters were frequently 
associated with churches. 
Most CISPES supporters were unaware of the organization’s links 
to Salvador’s Communist Party and the FMLN. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, which was aware of this link, twice investigated CISPES. At 
first, the FBI wanted to see if CISPES was an “agent of a foreign power” 
and thus forced to register with the Justice Department. The other 
investigation looked into possible support for terrorism. In both cases, the 
FBI found no criminal activity. As an inevitable consequence of these 
investigations, a lot of perfectly innocent Americans ended up being 
identified in FBI investigative files.44  
Inside the National Security Council and in the foreign affairs 
agencies, “public diplomacy” strategies were being drafted, reviewed, and 
redrafted. Projects undreamed of for many years, such as adding Voice of 
America transmitters, were suddenly welcome. 
The Administration had no ready mechanism to counterbalance 
CISPES. But they did have their bully pulpits, as with this March 19, 1981 
CNN interview of Secretary of State Al Haig: 
 
What we are watching is a four-phased operation of which phase 
one has already been completed—the seizure of Nicaragua, next 
                                           
43 The U.S. Embassy always used the term “churchwomen” because three of the four 
murdered women were nuns. The fourth, Jean Donovan, was a religious lay worker. For 
reasons of familiarity and convenience, this paper will henceforward use “nuns.” 
44 Predictably, it came to light that the FBI was taking down the license numbers in the 
parking lots of Unitarian churches. The FBI got slapped around for this, but they were 
doing their job.  
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is El Salvador, to be followed by Honduras and Guatemala. It’s 
clear and explicit. … I wouldn’t call it necessarily a domino 
theory. I would call it a priority target list—a hit list, if you 
will—for the ultimate takeover of Central America.45 
 
What the administration did not have was a way of using official 
funds to conduct systematic lower-level outreach, as a political campaign 
might do—and as the FMLN was already doing via CISPES. 
The government agency most capable of doing so was the U.S. 
Information Agency (USIA).46 But USIA was forbidden by law to 
undertake any activity directed to American citizens.47 In 1983, the 
administration created a special office at the State Department—S/LPD. 
The “S” indicated that it was a direct bureaucratic dependency of the 
Secretary of State; the “LPD” stood for Latin American Public 
Diplomacy. Although the S/LPD was housed at the State Department, it 
was effectively controlled by Lt. Col. Oliver North’s office at the National 
Security Council. S/LPD worked to persuade the American people of the 
wisdom of supporting the government of El Salvador and of opposing the 
Sandinistas in Nicaragua. S/LPD was disbanded after the Iran–Contra 
affair, when investigators questioned the legal authority for S/LPD’s 
actions. 
This public affairs offensive was not window dressing. With broad 
public outrage in the U.S. over the murder of the American nuns and all 
the other horror stories coming out of El Salvador, American public and 
congressional opinion, never far out of sync, were of profound 
                                           
45 For more information, see B. Gwertzman, “Haig Cites ‘Hit List’ for Soviet Control of 
Central America,” New York Times, March 18, 1981, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/03/19/world/haig-cites-hit-list-for-soviet-control-of-
central-america.html 
46Later absorbed into the State Department. 
47 Forbidding programming directed to U.S. citizens was intended to prevent taxpayer 
funds intended to influence foreigners from being diverted to partisan advantage for any 
incumbent administration. 
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importance. The Reagan administration had, with eyes wide open , chosen 
to make El Salvador an issue. Theodore Roosevelt was right about the 
presidency being a “bully pulpit”; every president has the power to call 
attention to a subject. What a president cannot do is determine what the 
press and public will see and say once they start examining that same 
subject. The administration had to convince the American people that this 
was important, that it was the right thing to do, and that it was “winnable.” 
At no point did public affairs take a back seat to the other elements of 
Salvador policy. 
All the this activity provoked notice and a call for caution. A New 
York Times editorial summed up the situation: 
 
Can it be that there’s method in the madness of tying 
President Reagan’s prestige to that of a junta in a coffee-bean 
republic?  
In a flash, the El Salvador junta’s struggle against 4,000 
guerrillas has been made front-page news. The Kremlin is told that 
fateful negotiations over nuclear arms depend on that junta’s 
success. Diplomats tour the world warning that whoever does not 
side with America in this effort invites retribution. Cuba has been 
threatened with blockade, and Mexico has been thus provoked into 
a show of sympathy for Cuba. All this for El Salvador?  
There can be only one rational explanation. Mr. Reagan 
foresees a quick win over the guerrillas and wants to advertise 
American muscle by making an exhibition game look like a World 
Series triumph … 
The junta may need more economic aid. But to lavish 
weapons on it now will only strengthen the right-wing extremists 
in its ranks, the ones who have been frustrating social justice and 
land reform and turning peasants into rebels ... 
That effort requires not bellicosity in Washington but 
shrewd diplomacy by all the Caribbean democracies, notably 
Mexico and Venezuela. Without an effective political program, 
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Mr. Reagan’s ostentatious strutting in a place of no strategic 
moment will indeed impress the world, but not in the way he 
intends.48  
 
 
Who won the public affairs offensive? The Reagan administration 
has to be counted as the winner. The administration got what it wanted and 
needed from Congress to carry out its policies, and the policy was more of 
a success than a failure. But the costs in damaged credibility and proper 
understanding of events linger. A cruise through the Internet will turn up 
thousands of pages of reporting and commentary outlining human rights 
abuses and war crimes in El Salvador and claims of misdeeds by U.S. 
officials. There is scant discussion of the misdeeds of the left. The fact of 
communist countries supplying arms is skipped or treated as paranoid 
fantasy. Little is said of FMLN rights abuses—including the murder of 
surrendered soldiers. If El Salvador comes up in popular entertainment, it 
is invariably cited not as the place where communism stopped, but as a 
horror story of U.S.-supported death squads, dead priests and nuns, and 
shorthand for U.S. misdeeds.  
Communism has failed and El Salvador is a democracy, but 
CISPES still exists and has expanded its scope to include solidarity with 
Venezuela. 
 
  
                                           
48 “Psychodrama in El Salvador,” New York Times, Feb. 27, 1981, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/02/27/opinion/psychodrama-in-el-salvador.html 
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VI. Policy to Practice  
 
As the Reagan administration set out to reverse the grim situation 
in El Salvador, abstractions became actionable. How do you put concepts 
such as “a 55-man limit” or “equipped for combat” or “hostilities are 
imminent“ into practice? 
 
A. The War Powers Act  
 
Of all these vague issues, none was more important or urgent than 
clarifying the War Powers Act. The Act was enacted in 1973 over 
President Nixon’s veto. Its purpose was to limit any president’s powers to 
send U.S. forces into battle without the explicit consent of Congress. To 
give a president the authority to respond to immediate threats without the 
entanglement of immediate congressional approval, presidents were 
permitted to deploy troops for a time without reporting. Many of its 
provisions were unclear and had never really been tested in court—and 
still have not. A Congressional Research Service unclassified analysis49 in 
March of 2004 included a section on El Salvador: 
 
  El Salvador: When Are Military Advisers in Imminent 
Hostilities? 
One of the first cases to generate substantial controversy 
because it was never reported under the War Powers Resolution 
was the dispatch of U.S. military advisers to El Salvador. At the 
end of February 1981, the Department of State announced the 
dispatch of 20 additional military advisers to El Salvador to aid its 
government against guerilla warfare. There were already 19 
military advisers in El Salvador sent by the Carter Administration. 
                                           
49 Perkins, Gerald M., ed., “The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty Years” 
(Hauppauge, NY: Novinka Books, 2005), pp. 11-12, 
http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32267.html. 
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The Reagan Administration said the insurgents were organized and 
armed by Soviet bloc countries, particularly Cuba. By March 14, 
the Administration had authorized a total of 54 advisers, including 
experts in combat training.  
The President did not report the situation under the War 
Powers Resolution. A State Department memorandum said a report 
was not required because the U.S. personnel were not being 
introduced into hostilities or situations of imminent hostilities. The 
memorandum asserted that if a change in circumstances occurred 
that raised the prospect of imminent hostilities, the Resolution 
would be complied with. A justification for not reporting under 
section 4(a)(2) was that the military personnel being introduced 
were not equipped for combat. They would, it was maintained, 
carry only personal sidearms that they were authorized to use only 
in their own defense or the defense of other Americans.  
The State Department held that section 8(c) of the War 
Powers Resolution was not intended to require a report when U.S. 
military personnel might be involved in training foreign military 
personnel, if there were no imminent involvement of U.S. 
personnel in hostilities. In the case of El Salvador, the 
memorandum said, U.S. military personnel “will not act as combat 
advisors, and will not accompany Salvadoran forces in combat, on 
operational patrols, or in any other situation where combat is 
likely.”  
On May 1, 1981, 11 members of Congress challenged the 
president's action by filing suit on the grounds that he had violated 
the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution by sending the 
advisers to El Salvador. Eventually there were 29 co-plaintiffs, but 
by June 18, 1981, an equal number of Members (13 Senators and 
16 Representatives) filed a motion to intervene in the suit, 
contending that a number of legislative measures were then 
pending before Congress and that Congress had ample opportunity 
to vote to end military assistance to El Salvador if it wished.  
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On October 4, 1982, U.S. District Court Judge Joyce Hens 
Green dismissed the suit. She ruled that Congress, not the court, 
must resolve the question of whether the U.S. forces in El Salvador 
were involved in a hostile or potentially hostile situation. While 
there might be situations in which a court could conclude that U.S. 
forces were involved in hostilities, she ruled, the “subtleties of 
fact-finding in this situation should be left to the political 
branches.” She noted that Congress had taken no action to show it 
believed the President's decision was subject to the War Powers 
Resolution. On November 18, 1983, a Federal circuit court 
affirmed the dismissal and on June 8, 1984, the Supreme Court 
declined consideration of an appeal of that decision. 
As the involvement continued and casualties occurred 
among the U.S. military advisers, various legislative proposals 
relating to the War Powers Resolution and El Salvador were 
introduced. Some proposals required a specific authorization prior 
to the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or combat in El 
Salvador. Other proposals declared that the commitment of U.S. 
Armed Forces in El Salvador necessitated compliance with section 
4(a) of the War Powers Resolution, requiring the President to 
submit a report.  
Neither approach was adopted in legislation, but the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee reported that the President had “a 
clear obligation under the War Powers Resolution to consult with 
Congress prior to any future decision to commit combat forces to 
El Salvador.” On July 26, 1983, the House rejected an amendment 
to the Defense Authorization bill (H.R. 2969) to limit the number 
of active duty military advisers in El Salvador to 55, unless the 
President reported any increase above that level under section 
4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. Nevertheless, the 
Administration in practice kept the number of trainers at 55.  
 
HAMILTON: EL SALVADOR IN THE 1980s 
 
43 
 
As this ex post facto CRS compilation makes clear, the War 
Powers Act and the Reagan administration’s careful avoidance of its 
triggers guided military action in El Salvador in two critical ways. First, it 
created the 55-man limit on the size of the MILGRP. Although this limit 
never had the force of law, it became an informal but honored deal 
between the administration and Congress: Keep it at 55 and we the 
leadership will not seek a confrontation over the War Powers Act. The 
second was the administration’s pledge to Congress that U.S. military 
personnel “will not act as combat advisors, and will not accompany 
Salvadoran forces in combat, on operational patrols, or in any other 
situation where combat is likely.” This second pledge defined the 
operational boundaries for U.S. personnel. 
 
B. “The 55-Man Limit” 
 
Congress and the administration had agreed to this limit with little 
discussion or rancor. This was something like a handshake deal. When 
some members attempted to write it into law, they failed. 
This seems like the way policy and politics ought to work. 
Honorable individuals of two branches of government and two parties 
decide what the issue is—we want to avoid creeping from training and 
advice to full-scale involvement à la Vietnam. How do you do it? You 
keep the numbers too small to get into real trouble. What size is that? 
The 55-man limit, in which so many put so much stock (and many 
thought was the law of the land) was arbitrary and had been reached in 
offhand fashion. The exchange, which took place in a public hearing, went 
something like this: 
 
Congress: How many men do you plan on sending down there? 
Administration: Not many. 
Congress: How many are there right now? 
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Administration (after checking with staff present at the hearing): 
 About 55. 
Congress: Do you think you can live with that? 
Administration (after further checking with staff): Yes. 
 
That was it. Rumors that the limit had been inspired by the 
previous nationwide speed limit of 55 mph were false. 
So far, so good.  
But which military personnel were to be counted in the 55-man 
limit?  
Surely Congress did not mean to count the Defense Attaché’s staff, 
did they? Marine Security Guards? What about the MILGRP permanent 
party of six? If you counted all the military personnel in the embassy, you 
would already be close to the limit. 
Rules about who counted were roughed out, mostly at the embassy, 
and then vetted informally with the administration and Congress. Here is 
what emerged: 
 
 Defense Attachés and their support staff did not count. 
 Marine Security Guards did not count. 
 Seabees, who periodically serviced or installed technical security 
equipment around the embassy, did not count. 
 After a few years, permanent party at the MILGRP did not count. 
 Brief moments during a single day did not count, but remaining 
overnight (RON) did. 
 
That meant that the 55 men were TDY military personnel who 
came to El Salvador to conduct military training, essentially all MTTs.  
MILGRP staff took this seriously. The executive officer kept the 
tally. From time to time, some MTT member (or entire team) would get an 
urgent instruction: “We are up against the limit. We have got some 
personnel arriving this afternoon on an urgent mission. Go to Ilopango Air 
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Base and take the C-130 to Panama. No mistakes, if you miss the flight we 
are over the limit. Stay at Southcom until we send for you.” 
With time, the rules were eased.  
The six-man permanent party in the MILGRP was insufficient to 
support all the movement of all the supplies and MTTs flowing into the 
country. Congress was notified, did not object, and the staff was increased 
to 12. 
After about 18 months, it became obvious that Salvadoran soldiers 
injured on the battlefield were dying or becoming permanently disabled 
because Salvadoran battlefield medics were insufficient in numbers and 
deficient in training. The U.S. had the capacity to train them, but did not 
have a means to do so within the 55-man limit. Eventually Congress 
informally agreed to exclude members of a medical MTT from the count. 
All this was possible because it became clear the administration 
was operating in good faith. MTT members were not being sent on combat 
missions (and when a few did, they were disciplined and sent home). 
Similarly neither the MILGRP nor the broader mission50 was attempting to 
sneak in off-the-books personnel. 
In time, the 55-man limit ceased to be a topic of anything more 
than minor administrative interest. Congress became confident that their 
insistence on this point was respected, and its demands for head-count 
reports dwindled. 
El Salvador specialists at State and Defense came to regard the 
limit as a blessing. The hard ceiling on personnel effectively and 
permanently closed off any chance of “Americanizing” the fight. No 
bureaucratic or political blood was spilled trying to ward off unwelcome 
                                           
50 The “mission” spoken of here and henceforward, unless context makes another 
meaning clear, follows State Department usage and means the embassy as a whole, the 
“diplomatic mission.” Understanding that all executive branch personnel were part of the 
embassy—that is, the diplomatic mission—is essential. Everyone at the mission worked 
for the ambassador before anyone else. The term of art is “under chief-of-mission 
authority.”  
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pressures for American troops to do more. The Green Berets, Rangers, and 
SEALs who ran the program knew of T.E. Lawrence’s dictum about 
“eating soup with a knife,”51 and the 55-man limit removed the temptation 
to ignore Lawrence’s rule “just this once.” 
The limit also brought an even subtler but perhaps more valuable 
benefit: The military personnel assigned to the MTTs, especially the most 
senior officers, were generally excellent. With a ceiling of 12 permanent 
party and 55 with non-medical MTTs, MILGRP commanders were able to 
request, and often received, the very best our military had to offer. At least 
in the early going, the caliber of MTT personnel, including Spanish-
speakers, was clearly exceptional.52 
  
C. Equipped for Combat? 
 
  
February 14, 1982 
U.S. TELLS OFFICER WHO CARRIED RIFLE TO LEAVE 
SALVADOR 
 
After CNN aired video of five U.S. military personnel dressed in 
Hawaiian shirts or guayaberas, carrying M-16 rifles, the fat was briefly in 
                                           
51 As the story goes, T.E. Lawrence (a.k.a. Lawrence of Arabia) said that it was important 
to let foreign forces do things themselves. He acknowledged that this might be messy, 
“like eating soup with a knife.” 
52 This view is not universal. On March 29, 1988, the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard 
University sponsored the “Small Wars Symposium: The Case of El Salvador.” This 
seminar was based on a paper presented by LTC A.J. Bacevitch, LTC James D. Hallums, 
LTC Richard H. White, and LTC Thomas F. Young entitled “American Military Policy 
in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador.” The paper (sometimes called “The Four 
Colonels Report”) suggested that the military did not properly recognize those who 
served in El Salvador. See Bacevitch et al., “American Military Policy in Small Wars: 
The Case of El Salvador” (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1988). 
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the fire—and the flames reached the Oval Office. On February 12, 1982, 
President Reagan ordered an investigation of the incident. 
On February 13, Ambassador Deane Hinton, acting on his 
authority as the president’s personal representative in El Salvador, ordered 
Lt. Colonel Harry Melander to leave El Salvador. Hinton said that Lt. Col. 
Melander was “a first-class officer who made a mistake.” Melander had 
been in Usulután province with four other officers to visit and perhaps to 
help Salvadoran soldiers repair a bridge that had been blown up by the 
FMLN. The other officers were given what Ambassador Hinton described 
as “firm, oral reprimands.”53 
While swift public action kept this from becoming a major incident, 
two ill effects were created: First, the U.S. military’s media-averse habits 
were reinforced, and, second, the idea was established in the press corps 
and other places that a soldier carrying an M-16 was on a combat mission. 
It seemed to go right over everyone’s head that no professional soldier 
would voluntarily go into combat wearing khakis and a Hawaiian shirt.  
Taped to the inside of MILGRP Commander John Waghelstein’s 
door was an 8″×10″ photo of Senator Nancy Kassenbaum (R-Kansas) 
walking down a Salvadoran street. She was in El Salvador to observe the 
March 1982 elections. Walking alongside her was a bodyguard from the 
State Department’s Diplomatic Security bureau. He wore a fine pinstriped 
suit and carried a loaded M-16 with his hand on the pistol grip and the butt 
cradled in his elbow. Stuck to the photo was a red ribbon impressed with 
the embassy’s official seal (borrowed for the occasion from the consul 
general). The caption below the photo read: “State Department Award for 
who gets to carry M-16s in El Salvador.” 
As things played out in practice, MILGRP personnel were the only 
members of the mission whose armaments were restricted by anything 
                                           
53 Bonner, Raymond, “U.S. Tells Officer Who Carried Rifle to Leave Salvador,” New 
York Times Feb. 13, 1982, http://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/14/world/us-tells-officer-
who-carried-rifle-to-leave-salvador.html. 
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other than common sense. Many, perhaps most, mission members carried 
handguns with varying degrees of concealment. Long guns at home or in a 
vehicle were commonplace.  
Sometimes participating in a farce is the price you pay for doing 
your job.  
Most military trainers and MILGRP staff carried a pistol in one of 
the barely big enough “man purses” widely available at the time. The 
small bags were, at a time when sexual orientation was completely 
unprotected in the military (and almost everywhere else): called “fag 
bags.” They were popular not only with the MILGRP but with many 
Salvadoran civilians. Sitting in a restaurant, one might see conservatively 
dressed businessmen put their small bag down on the table and hear a 
resounding THUNK from the completely obvious contents. 
By early 1983, the question of M-16s or other personal weapons 
was coming to be recognized for its essential silliness. During one of his 
regular meetings with the press, MILGRP Commander Waghelstein was 
asked if he felt a .45 was sufficient protection. He responded by saying, “I 
carry a gym bag. There is a piece of Israeli steel in the bag. When that 
steel gets nervous, it stutters in Hebrew.” None of the journalists thought it 
newsworthy to write that our soldiers did not limit themselves to pistols. 
All discussions about how MILGRP members might be permitted 
protect themselves ended on May 25, 1983. That is when MILGRP 
Executive Officer Lt. Cmdr. Albert A. Schaufelberger, Jr. was 
assassinated on the campus of the Central American University. From then 
on, MILGRP personnel armed themselves as they saw fit. 
 
D. “Where Is the Combat Zone?” 
 
 
 
U.S. MILITARY ADVISERS ARE FOUND IN A COMBAT ZONE 
IN EL SALVADOR 
By RAYMOND BONNER  
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SAN MARCOS LEMPA, El Salvador, June 23—In an 
apparent violation of restrictions governing their activities in El 
Salvador, American military advisers were encountered in a 
combat area on the Lempa River here today. 
Salvadoran soldiers said they had seen the Americans carry 
M-16 automatic rifles. State Department regulations prohibit them 
from carrying automatic rifles or being in combat zones. 
Two Salvadoran soldiers guarding the Lempa River Bridge 
here, 40 miles southeast of San Salvador, said the armed 
Americans were seen at the bridge Tuesday and this morning. 
There was sporadic firing of automatic weapons and the thud of 
mortars as an O-2 spotter plane circled overhead.  
Salvadoran soldiers patrolled in the fields and along the 
highway where a bus was burning. They said guerrillas had 
attacked the bus in the morning. The rebel radio said Tuesday that 
traffic along the highway would be subject to attack beginning 
today.54 
 
The final two paragraphs of the story carried the embassy 
response: 
In San Salvador, a spokesman for the U.S. Embassy, Don 
Hamilton, said on being told by the reporters what the had seen on 
the Lempa River: 
“We are now investigating. If the guidelines have been 
violated, appropriate action will be taken.” In February, an Army 
officer, Lieut. Col. Harry Melander, was sent home after he had 
                                           
54 Bonner, Raymond, “U.S. Military Advisers Are Found in a Combat Zone in El 
Salvador,” New York Times, June 23, 1982, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/24/world/us-military-advisers-are-found-in-a-combat-
zone-in-el-salvador.html. 
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been seen carrying an M-16, and four other Americans received 
reprimands.55 
 
This story raises a number of issues about fair reportage and 
government honesty: 
 
 Tendentiousness (“in apparent violation”): The facts in the story 
(aside from technical assertions noted below) are narrowly correct, 
but the article as a whole seems designed to demonstrate that U.S. 
soldiers were in combat. 
 Questionable assertions (“encountered in a combat area”): What 
is a “combat area”? The U.S. Embassy itself had been rocketed and 
strafed about two dozen times at this point. On the other hand, the 
bridge on the Rio Lempa was unquestionably more volatile than 
the capital. 
 Lack of precision: There was never a “State Department 
regulation” prohibiting U.S. military personnel from “being in 
combat zones.” This is a technicality, but technicalities matter. 
Regulations on these issues came from the U.S. ambassador and 
amounted to embassy regulations conveyed from the president’s 
personal representative down through the chain of command. No 
area of El Salvador was off-limits to military personnel or anyone 
else. They were under orders to avoid combat. The best test was 
simple: Were American soldiers going “in harm’s way”? Were 
they accompanying Salvadorans on combat operations?  
 Sourcing: One must read the article closely to discover that while 
reporters saw two U.S. soldiers in fatigues in military camp, 
accounts of the soldiers firing weapons are secondhand.  
                                           
55 Ibid. 
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 Man on a mission: One element of the story says a “van with 
reporters” pulled up to the military camp. No other reporters 
considered the “story” to be worth reporting. 
 
Several weeks later, at the farewell party for the MILGRP exec as 
he left for onward assignment, he confessed to the PAO that he had lied.56 
There had been an attack by the guerrillas and the sergeant had 
participated in repelling the attack. 
The PAO did not conceal his anger. His credibility and that of the 
embassy had been at stake. There had been nothing to hide; the sergeant 
was defending himself when he came under attack in the course of training 
Salvadoran military personnel. But now there was something to hide—
misleading the New York Times.  
The lieutenant colonel was apologetic, but defended his action: “I 
did not know you then … was not sure I could trust you.” He went on to 
say that the sergeant had reported the incident, but that he, the lieutenant 
colonel, had decided to shelve the matter, to say nothing to anyone. 
The PAO was hardly assuaged: “If you play straight with me, I can 
handle just about anything short of criminality. You have put the mission 
at risk by lying to me. We could have announced self-defense and stood 
our ground.” 
Nothing further happened with regard to the incident, which passed 
as simply another case of he-said/she-said. 
If the PAO had known before Bonner’s call and perhaps after, he 
could likely have persuaded the ambassador to let him make a preemptive 
announcement, something like: “While conducting training, a U.S. soldier 
and his Salvadoran trainees came under fire. He and his trainees returned 
fire. There were no casualties.” Such an announcement, either 
preemptively or in response to a question, makes a circumstance seem less 
secretive and sinister. Were a formal announcement made, it would have 
                                           
56 Source is direct personal experience of the author. 
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gone to all available media, taking away the Times exclusive—an 
announcement is less interesting than a media “discovery.” 
Flare-ups about American military personnel being in “combat 
zones” notwithstanding, the media, Congress, and everyone else came to 
understand within about a year that there were no “combat zones” in El 
Salvador.  
There were areas where guerrilla activity was very high or 
persistent, but the Salvadoran Army could and did go anywhere in the 
country. When they entered an area of strong guerrilla influence, they 
might encounter small, improvised land mines, booby traps really, but the 
FMLN had no intention of letting the Salvadoran army maneuver them in 
a set piece battle. They knew the army would pin them down with infantry 
and then hammer them with air and artillery.  
When they saw the army out in strength, they did what sensible 
guerrillas do—they melted away. 
As the “combat zone” non-issue faded, the real question began to 
emerge: What are combat operations? This is a sensible and important 
distinction. From President Reagan on down, no one wanted our troops 
involved in operations.  
 
E. What Are Combat Operations?  
 
The War of Stanley’s Leg 
With perhaps 30,000 dead in El Salvador at the time, it is hard to 
believe that an E-6 with a leg wound would make news around the United 
States. But it happened. This story, from the Spokane Chronicle of 
February 5, 1983 is typical: 
 
3 Relieved of Duties in El Salvador Injury 
WASHINGTON (AP) – Two U.S. warrant officers and a 
sergeant have been relieved of their duties in El Salvador because 
of an incident in which another American military adviser was 
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wounded during a helicopter mission, a Pentagon spokesman said 
today. 
A statement initially released this morning by the U.S. 
Embassy in El Salvador also disclosed that another American 
military trainer went on a separate “operational” flight which took 
ground fire at about the same time. U.S. military advisers have 
standing orders not to participate in such operations. 
Lt. Col. Richard Rapp provided the text of the embassy 
statement dealing with Wednesday’s incident, in which Staff Sgt. 
Jay Thomas Stanley, 25, of Towson, Md., suffered a leg wound 
from ground fire. 
Stanley was the first American soldier wounded in El 
Salvador since U.S. military advisers were sent to the Central 
American nation in 1981. The force is limited to 55 personnel, but 
there were 37 advisers in the country Thursday. … 
The embassy said that “as a result of our findings, two 
warrant officers and one master sergeant have been relieved of 
their duties by the USMILGROUP (U.S. military advisory group 
in El Salvador) commander and will leave the country on the next 
available military aircraft.”57 
 
 
Issues for Discussion: 
 
 Why were the MILGRP and the embassy so forthcoming about a 
minor injury and administrative relief of two warrant officers and a 
master sergeant? 
 This was a minor thing; why not keep it secret?  
                                           
57 “3 Relieved of Duties in El Salvador Injury,” Spokane Chronicle, Feb. 5, 1983, p. 9, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1345&dat=19830205&id=5epWAAAAIBAJ&s
jid=c_kDAAAAIBAJ&pg=3937,1869902. 
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 Why publicize punitive reassignments at this level? 
 Wouldn’t it have been easier to just give everyone involved a good 
talking to? They would keep their mouths shut. 
 
The ambassador, the MILGRP commander, and the public affairs 
counselor instinctively knew and agreed that a one-day splash with plenty 
of facts was better than a story coming out in dribs and drabs. Were the 
story to get into the press from a non-government source, or worse yet, an 
unidentified government source, the embassy and by extension the 
administration would appear to be covering up combat operations by 
American soldiers. After having assured the Congress and the public that 
our military was trying to avoid combat, this could affect the entire policy 
by embarrassing the ambassador and the State Department, the White 
House, and supporters in Congress.  
Keeping it secret would have been harder than it seems. Dozens of 
Salvadoran personnel, over whom we had no authority, knew of the 
incident. Some of them had probably been planted on the Salvadoran 
military by the FMLN. No one wanted them to announce the incident. 
The country was crawling with journalists. For U.S. news media, 
El Salvador was hottest international story. All major U.S. media 
maintained offices in El Salvador. Not just CBS, NBC, ABC, and CNN, 
but AP, UPI, National Public Radio, The New York Times, The 
Washington Post, Time, and Newsweek kept correspondents there. Many 
other news organizations, such as The Wall Street Journal, The Chicago 
Tribune, The Dallas Morning News, and the Los Angeles Times spent 
weeks at a time staffing El Salvador. The Salvadoran elections in 1982 
drew about 1,500 foreign journalists on top of those always present. There 
were no legal constraints on their movements or contacts. Members of the 
embassy staff encountered journalists in every part of the country, and 
many journalists embedded themselves with the insurgents for days on end. 
Journalists also had wide-ranging contacts in the Salvadoran government 
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and could count on hearing from fellow correspondents at the State 
Department, the Pentagon, and other bureaus around the world.  
These mostly forgotten incidents raise interesting issues: 
 
 Does any element of the U.S. government owe a straight answer to 
a reporter who shows evidence of bringing bias to a story? 
 What about a friendly reporter? 
 What were the options for the MILGRP exec? 
 What would have happened had he originally come clean with the 
PAO? 
 
In the charged atmosphere of the time, critics of the policy might 
have claimed that shooting back showed the inevitability of U.S. personnel 
becoming involved in combat and drawn into someone else’s war. 
Panicked bureaucrats in Washington might have demanded even tighter 
restrictions on where trainers could operate. The lack of flexibility would 
have reduced the effectiveness of the meeting. 
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VII. With Friends Like These 
 
Everyone assigned to El Salvador, civilian or military, shook 
bloodstained hands. Sometimes they knew who was a murderer; 
sometimes they did not. Knowing just how to react was not easy. Further 
complicating the matter was that individuals seemed to change their 
behavior with the passage of time. In 1980 and 1981, things were 
especially violent and, as noted above, the period between Ronald 
Reagan’s election and inauguration was shockingly violent. From 1981 
through the end of 1983, murders58 were still absurdly high—about 250 
death squad killings monthly.  
On December 11, 1983, Vice President George H. Bush visited El 
Salvador for several hours on his return from a visit to Argentina. He met 
with the Salvadoran High Command and showed them a letter from 
President Reagan. The vice president did not leave a copy of the letter, and 
it has not been published. Even so, it is widely known that the letter 
specified steps the Salvadoran military and government must take to curb 
death squad violence. Death squad activity dropped precipitously, as did 
reports of army massacres. In spite of sporadic outrages, death squad 
murders never again reached the levels of 1982 and 1983. 
 
A. The Nuns 
 
Colonel Eugenio Vides Casanova was commander of the 
Salvadoran National Guard when the four American churchwomen were 
raped and murdered by junior59 enlisted Guardsmen. Not long after the 
investigation began, it became clear that the women had been followed 
from the airport and murdered well before they got to the city. The 
                                           
58 As distinct from legitimate combat deaths. 
59 The most senior was a sub-sergeant. 
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embassy quickly determined that the National Guard was organizationally 
responsible for security at the airport and its environs. 
Nor was the nuns’ case the only black mark on the National Guard 
while it was under Colonel Vides’s command. The intelligence section of 
the National Guard was known to the U.S. to be, in effect, a death squad60 
financed by wealthy Salvadorans who bankrolled multiple murders, 
including the “Sheraton murders,” discussed below. 
When the individuals were identified and the U.S. asked for their 
weapons, the National Guard initially tried to play a shell game with their 
G-3 rifles. The game failed, and Colonel Vides became extraordinarily 
helpful with the investigation. Eventually, he was promoted to general and 
became defense minister. As time went on, those Americans who dealt 
General Vides found him understanding and helpful. Uniquely among the 
highest levels of the Salvadoran military, General Vides would privately 
acknowledge that there was significant corruption in the officer corps and 
that some officers were involved in death squads. 
Immediately following the critical 1984 El Salvadoran presidential 
elections, now Defense Minister Vides, with the rest of the high command 
lined up behind him, announced that the military stood 100 percent behind 
the official results—even though it was widely known that winner José 
Napoleón Duarte stood to the left of most officers. Vides put it this way in 
a nationally televised address when he said (approximately): This is not a 
game of cards where, if you do not like your cards, you can ask for a new 
deal. We in the Army have put up the blood for these elections and they 
will stand. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
60 The Mano Blanco 
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Discussion Questions 
 Did Defense Minister Vides come to recognize that there was a 
better way? That continuous, rampant human rights abuses 
strengthened the rebels? 
 At what point does a person, having failed to lead with integrity, 
become trustworthy? 
 Was Vides simply clever enough to tell the Americans what they 
wanted to hear? 
 Did the U.S. have any choice in this matter?  
 Could we have demanded a different defense minister?  
 Would it have mattered if we had? 
 
 
B. The El Mozote Massacre 
 
The Atlacatl Battalion, trained and equipped by the United States 
and stood up as an “Immediate Reaction Battalion,” was a fierce combat 
unit. But under its first commander, it was responsible for a major war 
crime.  
In late 1981, the Atlacatl Battalion, operating under the command 
of Lt. Col. Domingo Monterrosa, murdered about a thousand people, 
mostly women and children, in the northern town of El Mozote. The 
massacre has been investigated many times, and there is little doubt of its 
scope or the battalion’s responsibility.61 
About three years after El Mozote, Monterrosa was promoted to 
colonel and given command of the eastern third of the country, the area 
where guerrilla concentrations were highest and where most of the battles 
took place. It was hard to believe this man was the author of El Mozote.  
                                           
61 “The Report of the Truth Commission to the United Nations” of March 15, 1993 cites 
then Battalion Commander LTC Domingo Monterrosa Barrios as one of those 
responsible. The Truth Commission puts the number of those murdered as “over 200.” 
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His troops routinely passed out soccer balls to kids in villages. 
When he entered a village, he spoke of the guerrillas not as “communist 
terrorists” as did most of his fellow officers, but as “errant brothers.” He 
took prisoners and treated them well. He was eventually killed when the 
FMLN set a very clever trap for him. 
 
 
Discussion Questions 
 How should Americans respond to Monterrosa, the war criminal?  
 How should they respond to Monterrosa, the savvy commander 
who respected the populace?  
 
C. The Las Hojas Massacre 
 
In early 1983, Colonel Elmer Gonzalez Araujo ordered the 
battalion he commanded to massacre the inhabitants of Las Hojas, an 
indigenous agricultural commune in a very quiet area of the country. This 
massacre had nothing to with the ongoing war. Colonel Gonzalez was paid 
by a nearby rancher to take revenge on villagers who objected to having 
cattle driven across their crops. According to U.S. Embassy Human Rights 
Officer Eduardo Baez,62 up to 74 people were murdered with close-range 
shots to the head. Gonzales, along with all those charged, was cleared of 
all wrongdoing.  
Colonel Gonzalez was removed from troop command and made 
chief of procurement for the Salvadoran Army. In that position, he 
conspired with three American businessmen to repackage expired 
Yugoslav ammunition as U.S.-manufactured in order to make it eligible 
for purchase as military assistance. The ruse was discovered when some of 
the ammunition failed in combat. He was never charged for the murders or 
for corruption. 
                                           
62 Direct conversation with the author on the day of the event. 
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Discussion Questions 
 Should the U.S. have made representations to the Salvadorans 
demanding that Col. Gonzalez be prosecuted for the murders? 
 Would such demands have been honored? 
 How do you keep working with Salvadoran officers who worked 
against the prosecution of Col. Gonzalez—even after his corrupt 
procurements led directly to the deaths of Salvadoran soldiers? 
 
 
D. The Sheraton Murders 
 
The Sheraton murders stand as a signal event in El Salvador’s war. 
These murders, of two Americans and one Salvadoran, illuminate much of 
the country’s dark side. This single case involves death squads, military 
officers directly involved in cold-blooded murder, and the impunity from 
prosecution of military personnel and their collaborators for even the most 
dreadful crimes. The case reveals political interference with the judicial 
process, the intimidation of witnesses, and the refusal of the military, upon 
whom we were spending about a half-million dollars every day, to yield to 
U.S. pressure.  
Two American military officers played significant roles in solving 
the murders. 
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2337 Saturday 3 January 1981 
Salon Las Americas, Hotel Sheraton 
San Salvador, El Salvador63 
 
Three men sat alone in the dining room in the Sheraton Hotel. 
Mark Pearlman and Michael Hammer64 were American attorneys working 
for the American Institute of Free Labor Development (AIFLD). They 
were guests at the Sheraton and were finishing dinner with José Viera, 
president of the Salvadoran agrarian reform institute. All were involved in 
implementing the largest agrarian reform in the history of Central America. 
The first phase of the reform had been implemented, with huge chunks of 
the largest estates in the small country turned over to the peasants who had 
worked the land. 
At the entrance to the restaurant, a tall, pale, blond man with wavy 
hair pointed at the three and gestured with his head. Seconds later, two 
men dressed in windbreakers came in and pulled two Ingram machine 
pistols, one 9 mm, the other .45 caliber. They opened fire on the three and 
hit all of them multiple times. Pearlman crawled away from the table. One 
gunman stood astride him and fired a burst to his head. Amazingly, the 
bullets missed, but Pearlman died en route to the hospital. 
The U.S. government knew a great deal about the Sheraton 
murders from the beginning. Salvadoran Captain Ernesto Ávila Ávila, 
who had secured the weapons, got very drunk after the murders and told 
the whole story to a U.S. military officer assigned to the MILGRP. That 
                                           
63 Unless otherwise noted, all information about the Sheraton murders is drawn from (but 
not a quote of) the unclassified “Case Impression Memorandum” prepared by A. Carlos 
Correa (undated, but prepared in early 1984). Correa was a Justice Department prosecutor 
detailed to the embassy in San Salvador to follow the judicial processes concerning the 
death of U.S. citizens there. He provided the author with a copy of the memorandum in 
May 2013. 
64 On June 21, 2013, President Barack Obama nominated Michael Hammer’s son, also 
Michael Hammer, to be U.S. ambassador to Chile.  
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officer reported the information through channels straightaway. With the 
basic story understood, things started to clarify very quickly. 
By May 1981, a U.S. government agency was reporting details 
about those at the heart of the conspiracy. In a cable dated 30 May 1981,65 
the agency reported: 
 
Responsibility of “death squad” run by businessman 
Ricardo Sol Mesa and National Guard Major Dennis Moran for 
murders of Rodolfo Viera and U.S. citizens Michael Hammer and 
Mark Pearlman; use of the death squad to conduct bombings in 
San Salvador. [redacted] 
1. A mid-level National Guard Officer [redacted] said on 
27 May 1981 that Moran directed a “death squad” payrolled by 
Salvadoran businessman Ricardo Sol Mesa, and that Sol Mesa 
and Moran used this death squad to kill Rodolfo Viera, former 
head of the Salvadoran Agrarian Reform Institute (ISTA) at the 
Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador on 4 January 1981. [redacted] 
(Comment: U.S. citizens Mike Hammer and Mark Pearlman of 
the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) 
were killed along with Viera because they happened to be with 
Viera at the time and because they supported Viera’s agrarian 
reform activities. Hammer and Pearlman apparently were not 
targets in their own right.)  
2. Viera was a longstanding target of the Sol Mesa and 
Moran group, and they took advantage of his lengthy presence in 
the Sheraton Hotel for dinner on 4 January to assassinate him. 
The assassination was not preplanned; the decision to murder 
Viera was made on the spur of the moment. 
3. The death squad described above is responsible for the 
majority of bank bombings that have taken place in recent 
                                           
65 Approved for release with excisions in November 1993. 
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months in the capital city of San Salvador, as well as for the 
assassinations of many individuals thought to support leftist 
causes. The payroll of the death squad is estimated 20,000 
colones monthly (U.S. $8,000): with members normally paid 100 
colones daily (U.S. $40) during the periods they are assigned to 
work for the squad. [redacted] (Comment: Although not directly 
stated it is believed that the majority if not all members of the Sol 
Mesa and Moran death squad are members of the National 
Guard.) 
4. The Sol Mesa and Moran death squad operates on its 
own but is thought to have connections through former Army 
Captain Eduardo Alfonso Avila with another rightist group which 
is involved in similar activities. 
 
 
The first officer’s information was verified through another U.S. 
military officer and his wife. The chain of events that led to this 
confirmation began with a phone call from the Contadora Island Resort to 
the U.S. Embassy in Panama on May 8, 1982. The resort said a U.S. 
diplomat staying there had attempted to kill himself with an overdose. It 
turned out that the individual in question was not an American, but a 
Salvadoran military attaché assigned to Costa Rica—Captain Ávila. By 
coincidence, the American Defense Attaché (DATT) in Panama had 
known Ávila since 1977, when the attaché was assigned to San Salvador 
and Ávila worked at the Salvadoran general staff. The American attaché 
took Ávila, who was in distress and seemed to be having some kind of 
nervous breakdown, into his home.  
Over May 8 and 9, Ávila told the attaché’s wife the story of what 
had happened at the Sheraton. (He would not discuss this with the DATT 
present.) The account was rambling and disjointed, but confirmed what 
Ávila had said right after the murders. Ávila’s admissions and statements 
were quickly reported through interagency channels. 
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The actual shooters were two enlisted men from the Salvadoran 
National Guard. Major Mario Denís Morán, chief of Section 2 
(intelligence) of the Guard, was present. Lieutenant Rodolfo Isidro López 
Sibrián gave the orders to the triggermen. Ricardo Sol Meza, an afectado, 
a principal owner of the Sheraton whose land had been confiscated for 
land reform, was present, as was his brother-in-law, Hans Christ, also an 
afectado.66 Christ fingered the three victims. Captain Ernesto Ávila Ávila, 
who was AWOL from his post in Costa Rica, retrieved the Ingram 
machine pistols from the National Guard’s armory. 
American military officers had certainly done their job in passing 
information along. Even so, the combined efforts of the U.S. Departments 
of State, Defense, and Justice have never been able to get at any of the 
intellectual authors of these murders. The peace treaty that ended the war 
included an amnesty that put them beyond the reach of the legal system. 
This case is simple and straightforward. Powerful individuals often 
operating in the open got away with a very public murder of two 
American citizens and a prominent official of their own country.  
Here is a lesson to write on the palm of your hand: Military and 
economic assistance usually buy you cordiality, but often fail to give you 
leverage. 
There are plenty of examples, but four words will serve for the 
moment: Israeli settlements; Hamid Kharzai. 
 
E. The Jesuit Murders 
 
6 PRIESTS, 2 OTHERS SLAIN IN SAN SALVADOR  
FIGHTING INTENSIFIES FOR CONTROL OF CAPITAL  
                                           
66 A Salvadoran told that author in the spring of 1984 that Christ, with whom he had gone 
to the American School, had been expelled from the American School for painting anti-
Semitic slogans on the lockers of Jewish students. 
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By Lee Hockstader and Douglas Farah67  
SAN SALVADOR, NOV. 16—Six prominent Jesuit priests, 
including the rector and vice rector of El Salvador’s most 
prestigious university, were killed early today along with two other 
persons at the house where they slept in the capital.  
 
At least two U.S. Army officers knew who did it and sat on the 
information before reporting it to their chain of command.68 
On November 16, 1989, some four days into another a final 
offensive in El Salvador, six Jesuit priests were murdered, along with their 
maid and her daughter, at their home on the University of Central America 
(UCA) campus. The story was front-page news worldwide. The murders 
led the news on all U.S. broadcast networks and on CNN. People with 
even passing knowledge of events in San Salvador suspected the right. 
UCA Rector Ignacio Ellacuría, one of those murdered, had been critical of 
the Salvadoran government and military and spoken and written of the 
FMLN and FDR in sympathetic terms. He was known to many foreign 
journalists and to some present and past officers of the U.S. Embassy. The 
U.S. government and the Salvadoran government, including President 
Alfredo Cristiani, feared blame would attach to the Salvadoran military or 
the government at an unusually sensitive time: 
 
 El Salvador’s president was seeking legitimacy for himself and his 
party. 
 Cristiani was the first president from the Alianza Republicana 
Nacionalista (Republican Nationalist Alliance, or ARENA).69 
                                           
67  Lee Hockstader and Douglas Farah, “6 Priest, 2 Others Slain in San Salvador,” 
Washington Post Foreign Service, November 17, 1989, p. A01. 
68 Unless otherwise indicated, all information in this account has been verified by 
William J. Dieterich, who was Chargé d’ Affaires, a.i. at the U.S. Embassy in San 
Salvador at the time of the events.  
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Many considered ARENA to be a front for the death squads. Party 
founder Roberto D’Aubuisson, widely considered to be “Mr. Death 
Squad,” had been its first presidential candidate. The party had 
specifically selected Cristiani as its candidate because he was 
financially and politically conservative, but not linked to rights 
abuses. Cristiani wanted to polish his party’s and his country’s 
image on human rights. 
 The Cold War was ending. The Soviet bloc was crumbling; the 
Berlin Wall had come down exactly one week before the murders. 
No one knew what this would mean for El Salvador, which all 
understood to be, at least in part, a proxy war between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union. The Cold War was ending and that could end 
outside arms support for the government and the rebels. 
 Peace talks had begun. The first direct talks between the 
Salvadoran government and the FMLN had opened in Mexico City 
in September. There was promise here of a genuine negotiated 
settlement—but the murder of the Jesuits might well kill the peace 
talks. 
 
There was nothing solid at first, but the assumption that 
Salvadoran military or police forces were involved was widespread. The 
government was reaching out around the world for ideas on how to 
respond to worldwide outrage.70  
                                                                                                         
69 In Spanish, arena means “sand,” which refers back to the original Latin and survives in 
English as a place where sand is figuratively, and sometimes literally, spread. 
70 The Salvadoran press attaché in Washington called the author of this paper. The attaché 
had left El Salvador over three years before and was then press secretary to Drug Czar 
William J. Bennett. The attaché told the author that he was calling on instructions from 
President Cristiani, relayed through Salvadoran Ambassador Miguel Salaverría, to ask 
what the government should say. The author’s advice was twofold: (1) Do not deny that 
your armed forces are responsible. They may be. If they are, the civilian government then 
looks complicit; and (2) seek (and publicly announce that you are seeking) detailed 
outside investigation by a foreign country other than the U.S. The U.S. is too close to El 
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In mid-December, Salvadoran Army Colonel Carlos Avilés, who 
had been well and favorably known to U.S. embassy officers for many 
years, privately told a U.S. Army major that the priests were killed by a 
small group from the Salvadoran Army’s Atlacatl Battalion.71 
The major knew, he had to know, that he was holding explosive 
information—information that could end U.S. assistance to El Salvador 
and give fresh impetus to the FMLN. There was really no way to gauge 
what might happen if the Salvadoran Army were found to have committed 
these murders. Salvador might become a new Cuba. Ten years of battles 
between two administrations and five Congresses might be rendered moot.  
On January 2, 1990, the major reported to his boss, the MILGRP 
commander, a U.S. Army colonel. Even more than the major, the 
MILGRP commander had to know the potential impact of this information. 
The colonel reported directly to the U.S. ambassador and met with him 
several times weekly. He had one-on-one access to the ambassador 
whenever he wished. 
The MILGRP commander’s options included, but were not limited 
to, the following: 
 
 Report this information immediately to Chargé d’Affaires, a.i. 
William J. Dieterich—the senior U.S. official in El Salvador. 
(Ambassador William Walker was not in El Salvador.) As Chargé, 
Dieterich had extensive authority over every individual in every 
U.S. executive-branch agency in the country. Dieterich thus was 
the MILGRP commander’s lawful and immediate superior. 
Reporting this information to Chargé Dieterich would have meant 
an immediate report to the State Department. Regardless of the 
                                                                                                         
Salvador and if it finds the Government of El Salvador or the military blameless, no one 
would believe it.  
71 There is another version of events suggesting that the major learned of the murders in 
October 1989—some weeks before they occurred. The major is reported to have given 
contradictory statements to the FBI about almost everything related to the case. 
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channel in which Dieterich reported the information to State, the 
National Security Council staff and quite possibly President 
George H. Bush would know within hours. With information 
rocketing around the executive branch, Congress and the media 
would probably know within 24 hours. 
 Immediately report to and seek guidance from the Commander in 
Chief, U.S. Southern Command. This would have skirted the 
responsibility of informing the Chargé, but that loop would have 
closed within the hour. 
 Inform an intelligence officer within the embassy. This might 
permit quiet investigation and a considered response before the 
whole world knew of this information. 
 Make discreet inquiries with the Salvadoran armed forces to gauge 
the credibility of the major’s report. 
 Arrange to speak directly with Colonel Avilés to judge his 
credibility and learn something of his sources. 
 
How did this play out in real life? 
The immediate actual steps followed by the MILGRP commander 
are not clear. It is certain that he did not report the information to the 
Chargé d’Affaires, to Southcom, or to some intelligence officer in the 
embassy.72 The MILGRP commander did, however, communicate the 
information to Colonel René Emilio Ponce, chief of staff of the 
Salvadoran armed forces. 
The day after the major informed the MILGRP commander, there 
was a meeting in Colonel Ponce’s office. Those present were Colonel 
Ponce and Colonel Avilés, the American major and the commander of the 
MILGRP, and perhaps one fairly junior State Department officer.  
What happened at the meeting?  
 
                                           
72 Telephone interview with Chargé d’Affaires William J. Dieterich, May 14, 2013. 
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 The essential story was repeated; Avilés told the American major 
that the Atlacatl Battalion was responsible. 
 Avilés flatly denied that he had ever said a word to the American 
major about the murders of the Jesuits.  
 
Five days later, on Sunday, January 7, 1990, President Cristiani 
announced that elements of the Salvadoran military were involved in the 
murder of the Jesuits. He said a “Special Commission of Honor” had been 
created to expose the truth about the murders in detail. 
 
* * * 
 
We have no idea why the MILGRP commander behaved as he did. 
His actions put a confidential source’s life at risk. He totally ignored his 
chain of command. His career could have ended right there. The Chargé 
considered immediately relieving him of his command and ordering him 
out of the country—he had the authority to do so. Had there been any 
question about that authority, a phone call to Southcom would have 
resolved the matter. 
Only two individuals were ever convicted of the murders. In 1991, 
Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides, then commandant of El Salvador’s 
military academy (sited in the same complex as the ministry of defense 
and high command) was convicted of giving the orders. Lieutenant 
Yuhssy René Mendoza, an officer in the Atlacatl Battalion, was convicted 
for his participation. A civilian court sentenced the two to 30 years in 
prison. The other seven, many of whom had acknowledged their roles, 
were acquitted. The jury is thought to have freed them because they were 
“following orders.” Benavides and Mendoza were set free on April 1, 
1993 as a result of the amnesty law that was agreed to in the peace 
agreement. They served less than two years for these mass murders. 
What happened with the Jesuit murders? Why did two American 
officers behave in such an unorthodox fashion?  
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Consider the following questions:  
 Why might the major have delayed reporting, even for a few days, 
his information about the most notorious murders in the world? 
 The MILGRP commander burned a favorably known source to an 
organization he well knew capable of murder. Why?  
 The MILGRP commander was born in El Salvador and knew his 
way around Salvadoran society better than most Americans.  
 Had he come to over-identify with the Salvadoran military?  
 If you reach this conclusion, does a policy then have to be set that 
limits the possible assignments of foreign-born personnel?  
 Should the MILGRP commander have been relieved? By the State 
Department? By U.S. Southern Command? 
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VIII. Trust and Learning 
 
Collectively and singularly, the actions of these counterpart 
officers ranged from obstruction of justice to multiple murder to war 
crimes. But these cases do not represent the first or last time we have 
faced such issues. From the genocidal Joseph Stalin during World War II 
to Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s to various 
figures in Afghanistan today, the U.S. government has sent military and 
civilian personnel out to find a way to work with awful people. Sometimes 
our unsavory friends move up to a higher standard, sometimes they never 
get better, and sometimes they improve for a while and then go back to 
their old ways. 
What may make El Salvador a bit more poignant is its relatively 
small scale. Anyone assigned to the U.S. Embassy, military or civilian, 
had a fair chance of meeting some or all of the people involved in the 
above actions. Some of them, like General Vides Casanova and Colonel 
Monterrosa, were charming and seemed to move in the right direction as 
we spent more time with them. Others never displayed any redeeming 
qualities. 
How do you learn who is trustworthy? How do you trust someone 
who has ordered the murder of a thousand people? Covered up a 
massacre? Helped a fellow officer evade justice? 
 
A. A War in (and Sometimes With) the Media  
 
In popular memory, the American people were united as never 
before during “Good War,” World War II, the one fought by what reporter 
Tom Brokaw called “the Greatest Generation.” There had been no 
question about going to war: Japan had attacked us and then declared war 
(although the ex post facto declaration arose from error and not malice); 
Hitler declared war on us. We were in it, and Rosie the Riveter stood side-
by-side with John Wayne, big business, and everyone else. And yes, the 
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media were in it too, and there is no doubt about whose side they were on. 
War correspondents wore American military uniforms and, when attached 
to the troops, were subject to military law. The media submitted to 
military censorship with little complaint. Some scandals were reported and 
military officials criticized (think of Patton slapping the soldier73). Other 
disasters were known to the media, but never until much later—as when 
German E-boats slaughtered U.S. troops training for the invasion at 
Normandy.74 
Vietnam changed all that. Even when the U.S. presence was very 
small, the frictions between the media and first the military and then the 
broader government started to show. Why? What was different?  
 
 To begin with, there was no real argument about the need to fight 
World War II. Japan hit us with a sneak attack. Hitler declared war 
on us. The stakes and the sides were clear. 
 Vietnam was fuzzier. Americans were concerned about communist 
expansion, and Munich had taught us that concession to dictators 
just made things worse.75 Even so, Vietnam was a long way away 
from the United States. Then, as now, most Americans could not 
find it on a map.  
                                           
73 During the last days of the campaign in Sicily in 1943, then-Lt. Gen. George S. Patton 
slapped a hospitalized soldier. The incident drew national attention and to some extent 
overshadowed Patton’s fine leadership. General Eisenhower reprimanded Patton and 
ordered him to apologize to 7th Army troops. Richard Sommers (ed.), Vignettes of 
Military History, Vol. III (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 
February 1982). 
74 In the early morning hours of April 28, 1944, German E-boats operating from France 
attacked LSTs practicing for D Day (Operation Tiger) and killed 198 Navy and 441 
Army personnel. Because the incident could have revealed D Day plans, it was not 
reported until August 1944. Stars and Stripes [European Edition] 4, no. 237 (7 Aug. 
1944). 
75 In 1938, France and Britain reneged on a commitment to Czechoslovakia, permitting 
Hitler to seize much of that country and its arms works. British Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlin negotiated this agreement in Munich; explaining his cave-in, he told the 
British people that the Czechs were “a faraway people of whom we know little.” 
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 Reporters on the ground in Vietnam were speaking to field and 
company-grade officers. Their journalistic reports were about a 
different war than the one the generals were briefing in Saigon and 
Washington. Not only were these young journalists reporting a 
different war, they were also highlighting the differences between 
what they saw and heard and what the brass was saying.  
 At one point, the national security establishment was so frustrated 
with the reporting of New York Times correspondent David 
Halberstam that President Kennedy called Times publisher Arthur 
Ochs “Punch” Sulzberger to the White House. The president 
demanded that Halberstam be pulled from Vietnam. President 
Kennedy’s demand backfired. Sulzberger instead cancelled 
Halberstam’s upcoming vacation. He did not want Halberstam’s 
departure on vacation to be taken by the president as a sign that the 
Times had caved to him.76 
 In 1966, Harrison E. Salisbury, a distinguished journalist with a 
solid record of objectivity, went to North Vietnam. The essence of 
his reports was that bombing in the North caused terrible damage, 
but did not harm the communist government’s will or ability to 
fight.77 The Johnson administration and President Johnson himself 
were furious, as were many on the American right. 
 As the war progressed, the Nixon administration joined its two 
predecessors in laying the blame for declining public support on 
the media. In 1977’s two-volume The Big Story, Peter Braestrup 
argued that media preconceptions and prejudices tainted reporting 
                                           
76 Jones, Alex, “The Best of Times,” blog post, The New Yorker, September 29, 2012, 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/09/the-best-of-times.html; and 
Spencer C. Tucker, ed., The Encyclopedia of the of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social 
and Military History, p. 446 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
77 No Americans reported from Berlin during World War I, Berlin, or Tokyo during 
World War II, or from wherever the North Koreans happened to be during the Korean 
War.  
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on the psychologically and politically critical Tet Offensive of 
1968.78 Braestrup’s book argued that the U.S. government was 
telling the truth when it said that Tet had been a crushing defeat for 
the communist Viet Cong. As Braestrup explained it, the tainted 
reporting caused both supporters and opponents of the war in the 
U.S. to regard it as a defeat and played a major role in reducing 
support for the war. Braestrup’s book remains well respected by 
all—including many of the correspondents he blamed for alarmist 
reporting. 
 As things went on, the military kept telling the politicans that we 
were winning, and the media kept telling the American people that 
we were losing. That the military establishment came to mistrust, 
even hate, the media was not just unsurprising—it was inevitable. 
 
To put it simplistically, after the war was lost, liberals mused about 
how Kennedy might have pulled out after the 1964 election and griped 
that the Johnson administration’s false account of the Gulf of Tonkin 
incident79 had led us into a war we could not win. Conservatives spoke of 
how the media and left-wing politicians kept the United States from 
prevailing in a war that was completely winnable. After all, we were not 
defeated on the battlefield.80  
                                           
78 Braestrup, Peter, The Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and 
Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1977).  
79 We now know this was no incident at all. The Navy reported that U.S. ships had been 
attacked by the North Vietnamese in the Gulf of Tonkin. This purported attack led 
President Johnson to ask permission to expand the war in response. Congress gave him 
that permission with the “Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,” which became the legislative basis 
for the war. Almost all serious historians of the period agree there was no such attack. It 
is not clear if Johnson knew the report was at best wildly exaggerated. 
80 This paragraph, like the preceding one, is but a sketch of arguments often more 
nuanced and thoughtful than put forward here. Nevertheless, I believe that left and right 
may be fairly described as making their arguments align with these rhetorical stick 
figures.  
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By 1981, the U.S. military was again finding its way following the 
decade-plus of debacle in Vietnam. The military did find its way, but was 
nearly unanimous in declaring that journalists were prejudiced against it 
and that nothing good would come from dealing with them.  
 
B. Quivering Before the Camera 
 
The March 10, 1981 New York Times story “U.S. Advisers Taking 
Care in El Salvador” began: “The military advisers here live cautiously, 
avoiding publicity with almost as much care as they avoid the Marxist 
guerrillas who might want to shoot them.”81 
The article describes how a group of “several hundred journalists” 
had been “hounding them for pictures and interviews.” In an effort to 
satisfy the constant pressure from the media and demystify the U.S. 
presence, the embassy set up a press conference to expose some of the 
trainers to the press. 
The article described the encounter: 
 
At a news conference arranged by the United States Embassy 
today, one adviser, a helicopter maintenance instructor, said: 
“What makes you nervous—and I'll be honest with you guys—is 
the press. We have more problems with the press than with these 
people we are supposed to be aware of.” … 
 The two officers who met with the press today at Ilopango Air 
Force Base on the outskirts of San Salvador declined to give their 
names, ages, or places of birth or to speak of their families. 
 
The story went on to report: 
                                           
81 Schumacher, Edward, “U.S. Advisers Taking Care in El Salvador,” New York Times, 
March 10, 1981, http://www.nytimes.com/1981/03/10/world/us-advisers-taking-care-in-
el-salvador.html. 
HAMILTON: EL SALVADOR IN THE 1980s 
 
76 
 
 
they always carry a pistol. Their orders are not to get involved in 
any combat, but they are authorized to shoot in self-defense or to 
protect a fellow adviser.  
 
This odd little story makes the maintenance instructor look 
somewhat silly, but the story and his press statements accurately reflect 
two military preoccupations: (1) No one was to have any reason to believe 
our personnel were going into combat; and (2) nothing good could come 
from dealing with the media. 
 
C. Embrace the Hacks82 
 
This apprehension and mistrust of the press continued for the better 
part of a year. Things finally turned for the better with the arrival of 
MILGRP Commander Colonel John D. Waghelstein, a Special Forces 
officer who never served a tour in the Pentagon and had very limited 
experience in other branches or disciplines. In the following section, Col. 
Waghelstein, a faculty member of the U.S. Naval War College since his 
retirement from the Army, describes how he came to grips with the 
MILGRP’s morbid fear of the media. 
 
“Full Contact Media Relations,” by Col. John Waghelstein 
 
Prior to my assumption of command of the U.S. Military Group in 
El Salvador, I spent a month at Monterrey’s Presidio (U.S. Army language 
school). In addition to brushing up on my Spanish, I had an opportunity to 
                                           
82 Eventually, the media and the embassy press officers were on good enough terms with 
one another to turn normally pejorative terms into ironic terms of endearment. Press 
office “flaks,” slang for a PR person whose job is to keep journalists away from facts (or 
at least principals), and “hacks” (taken from “hack writer”) began openly using the terms 
in one another’s presence in a friendly way. 
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read the press coverage, both Latino and American. I was struck by just 
how bad the situation appeared in the press. The embassy traffic was more 
optimistic, but not by much. 
It seemed to me that press relations were not just a matter of 
making the Salvadoran Army, the U.S. Army, or President Reagan, or 
anyone look good. This was a substantive issue and had to be addressed as 
such. The American people, the Congress, and much of the administration 
took their understanding of El Salvador from the media. With clear 
skepticism about administration policy afoot, getting a fair shake from the 
press was of major importance. 
 
My brothers-in-arms did not universally accept my view on this 
matter. Upon arrival I had a brief exchange with the outgoing MILGRP 
commander who, when asked about his relations with the press, 
responded, “I don’t talk to those bastards, they’re all a bunch of 
communists….” 
About a week after taking command, I got a request from the 
outgoing embassy public affairs officer. Would I consent to an interview 
by a Christian Science Monitor correspondent whom I knew from 
Vietnam? For the price of lunch, I consented, with the caveat that anything 
I said was on background and not for attribution.  
The word got out that I would talk to the press, and my dance card 
quickly filled. Because the care and feeding of the Fourth Estate was not 
my primary function, some management was required. Don Hamilton, the 
new embassy public affairs officer, solved the problem with a once-a-
week session for as many non-Salvadoran media as wished to come.  
They could ask anything they wished, but by ground rules, I could 
be identified as a “foreign military observer” or a “western observer,”83 
                                           
83 This coyness had its purpose. Of course the Salvadorans knew I was the “observer.” 
But if they were not confronted with the fact that an American officer was making the 
comments, they would not have to demand an explanation of us. –J.W. 
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but not both. While any question could be asked, not all would be 
answered. I made it very clear that I would not answer questions about 
intelligence or current Salvadoran operations. These weekly 
backgrounders continued for the remaining 18 months of my tour and, 
from what I understand, through the tours of at least the next two 
MILGRP commanders. 
There were a number of concerns that occupied our efforts to 
support the El Salvadorans. The human rights issue was by far the most 
vexing. The issues were real and horrifying and there was ample reason to 
believe that the amorphous blobs referred to as “the right” and “the death 
squads” were responsible for much of the damage. Beyond that, there 
were obvious if not specific overlaps between the military and the security 
forces84 and the “death squads.” The military’s 50-year human rights 
record inspired no confidence. No military officer had ever been convicted 
of a human rights violation or other serious crime.  
There were plenty in Washington in and out of government who 
believed the whole effort to save the Salvadoran government85 was bad 
policy and immoral to boot. Our security assistance was specifically and 
generally linked to human rights.  
I knew I could not “brief away” the human rights issues. Nor could 
I “win over” the press. There would have to be palpable improvement for 
that to happen. At a minimum, the death squad count, which had fallen to 
about 250 monthly from its October 1980 high of 750, could not rise 
again. 
But even as we waited for further improvement on human rights, I 
resolutely believed that we could tamp down fears that the U.S. was 
beginning another Vietnam with a handful of “advisors” who would 
                                           
84 All the different police, paramilitary, and military (National Police, Treasury Police, 
National Guard, Army, Navy, Air Force, and even the Fire Department) were led from 
the same pool of military school graduates. –J.W. 
85 The junta was replaced by an elected Constituent Assembly as I arrived in country in 
1982. –J.W. 
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eventually become combatants. If we could clear that hurdle, we could 
have a basis for more balanced reporting.  
Our first break in the advisor/combatant issue came when the PAO 
told me that LIFE was eager for a story, with photos, on the trainers. At 
that time, LIFE was still a monthly magazine that covered news and had 
an important audience. The PAO and I talked it over, vetted it with the 
embassy front office, and set it up. 
The conditions were simple. No current or intelligence operations. 
Access would be limited to coverage of a SEAL Mobile Training Team 
(MTT) working with the Salvadoran Marine Commandos in Usulután 
Department and to a Special Forces MTT training the El Salvadoran 
Airborne unit at the Air Force Base at Ilopango. 
My charge to officers and men in the MTTs was straightforward: 
Tell the truth, but do not discuss current or future ops. Emphasis should be 
on our mission as trainers, not advisers.  
The headline alone justified the effort: “Tutors of War.” The 
embassy and State Department loved it. My other boss, SOUTHCOM 
Commanding General Wallace Nutting, viewed the article differently. I 
received a heavily marked-up copy by courier noting the following sins in 
red marker: One of the SEAL trainers was reported as saying one of the El 
Salvadoran troops he was working with was not the smartest; one of the 
photos showed one of the SEALs carrying a handgun in his belt; one of 
the Special Forces NCOs was photographed in a T-shirt, not wearing his 
uniform jacket.  
An Army general was not the only one with heartburn. My 
executive officer, SEAL Lt. Commander Albert A. Schaufelberger, who 
loved the assignment and had already been approved for an extension, 
received the following letter from his detailer: 
 
Mar 4 1983   
Dear Al, 
I’m writing to discuss two subjects. One is personal, the 
other (albeit related) is professional. 
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Let me begin by saying that I felt the article you and Petty 
Officer G.L. Stubblefie allowed to be written in Life Magazine is 
the most damaging written item against the community since the 
Washington Post article in 1978. Even worse, it may result in 
SEALs being removed from El Salvador and damage our 
continued presence in Central America. It was exactly the kind of 
article our liberal public needs to use as ammunition to get us out 
of that country. It also shows why the SF’s should replace us as the 
sole advisors. At least they wear uniforms, have regulation on 
military appearance standards, don’t degrade their counterparts, 
and don’t parade sidearms openly & dangerously like a Saigon 
Cowboy. You have both been compromised. IF you were any kind 
of target before, you are a bigger one now. 
This has already resulted in further degradation of our 
efforts in that a Senator came on the 11:00 Niteline commentary 1 
March 1983 to berate SEALs in El Salvador. I’m sure there is 
more to come. 
My second reason for writing is to let you know that I am 
in the process of attempting to line up a relief for you as quickly as 
possible. I intend to program the first qualified individual available 
to come through the training pipeline into your position. Your 
original PRD is still August 1983, but it will likely slip to a later 
date. As soon as an individual is identified, we will notify the 
replacement officer to run through the chain for approval. 
Regards, 
Signed 
G.L. Stubblefied 
Lcdr  USN 
Special Warfare Assignment 
 
When Al came to me with that bit of news, I decided I needed to 
do what I could to prevent his forced relief. The first consideration was 
that he was a fine officer making an outsized contribution. He was trusted 
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by and popular with the Country Team86 and with his Salvadoran 
counterparts. His extension would provide continuity after I rotated out in 
June. The other part of the equation was that I thought Al was getting a 
raw deal. He did not dream up this article and certainly did not “allow” it 
to be published in LIFE.  
Given a sense that a personal and professional error was in train 
and that I was absolutely furious, I did what any self-righteous hot head 
would do. I jumped channels and wrote a letter to someone with the 
authority to help: 
 
16 March 1983  
Admiral James D. Watkins 
Chief of Naval Operations 
Navy Department 
Washington, D.C. 20350 
 
Dear Admiral Watkins: 
 
LCDR Schaufelberger shared the enclosed March 4 letter 
with me as it deals with a possible curtailment of his tour. I find 
the letter erroneous both in fact and conclusion. While all Special 
Forces troops shown in the LIFE magazine are in uniform, it is by 
no means true that they “wear uniforms having regulation military 
appearance standards and they don’t parade their sidearms 
openly…” The only time military personnel under my command 
wear uniforms is when they are in large numbers working with 
large groups of Salvadoran trainees. In San Salvador we all wear 
civilian clothes. When they are in small groups outside the capital 
it becomes a judgment call depending on training areas, population 
                                           
86 The Country Team consists of the ambassador, DCM, all State Department section 
chiefs, and the heads of all other agencies at post. The team meets at least weekly.  
HAMILTON: EL SALVADOR IN THE 1980s 
 
82 
 
density, type of training, and the threat. This applies to SEALs as 
well as soldiers. Nothing would compromise personnel faster than 
appearing in U.S. uniform in La Union or any other town. The 
same applies to “regulation military appearance.” It was with some 
reluctance and at the specific urging of the Regional Security 
Officer that I gave up my “high and tight,” “airborne” haircut and 
allowed my hair to grow to a less conspicuous length. As for 
parading side arms openly, there is nothing conspicuous about that 
here in the capital, much less in a departmental capital that hosts a 
military base. 
Then there is the matter of conclusions. While the Navy 
Military Personnel Command Staff may find the LIFE magazine 
article “the most damaging written item against the community 
since 1978,” the consensus of this mission is that it has been 
helpful to our efforts in El Salvador. The article had its genesis in 
the contacts between our PAO and the associate editor of LIFE 
magazine. The idea was then approved by me and had the full 
knowledge and consent of the Ambassador. 
The Ambassador and his deputy and the PAO monitor the 
coverage of El Salvador in all major U.S. news organs. It is their 
opinion as well as mine that the LIFE article was positive and 
helped further public understanding of our policies in El Salvador. 
Our PAO, whose judgment I respect since he has served in 
Public Affairs at six overseas missions, ranging through 
Kissinger’s Shuttle Diplomacy, three overseas presidential visits, 
and the Sinai Field Mission, has explained to me that even if you 
can persuade a reputable publication to print something entirely 
favorable on a controversial topic, the effect is to make readers 
somewhat suspicious. Yes, some of our trainers are quoted making 
remarks that are a bit embarrassing, but that is the price you pay 
for giving journalists access to individuals. From the point of view 
of our mission in El Salvador one thing was made very clear: Our 
trainers do not go on combat missions. Especially in the aftermath 
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of the wounding of SSGT Stanley87 this is a message we are most 
happy to get across. 
As for the Senator’s report on the ABC Late Evening News, 
it concerns us very little. He is no friend of our policy here and 
those are the licks we have come to expect. Had it not been for the 
LIFE article it would have been another issue. Our PAO has 
already taken Chris Whipple88 to task for having said that trainers 
are “much closer to combat” than was generally supposed. When 
the PAO pointed out to Whipple that everyone, including the PAO, 
Vice Consuls, and our secretaries are much closer to combat than 
was generally understood, Whipple readily conceded that he 
should have said just that and has promised that in any future 
comment he might make on the subject he will make that clear. 
From the general tone of the letter, it sounds like someone 
is expecting something more like an “All Hands” article. Those of 
us in daily contact with a vigorous, inquisitive corps of 
professional journalists know and understand what is possible and 
what is not. My Ambassador is not upset, the Deputy Chief of 
Mission is not upset, the PAO is not upset, and most importantly 
for LCDR Schaufelberger, I am not upset. Given that the 
individuals most directly concerned with and most closely 
monitoring press coverage of El Salvador (and the military trainers 
here) believe the article to have been a plus for U.S. policy, I am a 
little surprised that the Naval Military Personnel Command is so 
excited. 
I find LCDR Schaufelberger to be a dedicated and capable 
officer and I maxed his last fitness report to reflect my satisfaction 
with his performance. In view of his valuable contributions to our 
mission here, I recommend that he be permitted to stay as long as 
                                           
87 Noted elsewhere 
88 Author of the story in LIFE 
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he wishes. He was given a verbal OK by his detailer for a one-year 
extension prior to the LIFE magazine article. I would appreciate 
your taking a hand in this matter. 
 
(Signed) 
JOHN D. WAGHELSTEIN 
COL, Inf Commanding 
 
 
In due course, I received a nice response:  
 
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL 
25 April 1983 
Dear Colonel Waghelstein, 
Admiral G.L. Stubblefie asked that I respond to your recent 
letter to him concerning Lieutenant Commander A.A. 
Schaufelberger, USN. The letter by Lieutenant Commander 
Stubblefield contained his personal views about the contents of the 
LIFE magazine article. His concerns were made as a member of 
the Naval Special Warfare community and should more 
appropriately have been made in a separate personal letter; he has 
been so counseled. 
As previously agreed upon between Lieutenant 
Commander Schaufelberger and his detailer, his original rotation 
date of August 1983 has been extended one year until August 1984. 
He will be kept informed of his future assignment as well as plans 
for his relief via the normal Navy channels. I appreciate the fine 
work of you and your men. 
 
With kindest regards. 
 
The letter took five weeks to get back because the vice admiral 
sent his mail through channels. I was pleased with the letter; 
HAMILTON: EL SALVADOR IN THE 1980s 
 
85 
 
SOUTHCOM’s General Nutting was fine with the contents but less 
pleased with me. I had jumped channels and written a cheeky letter to a 
four-star in another service. Although incensed, he came to recognize that 
better-informed journalism advanced our efforts. 
There was much more work to be done with the El Salvadoran 
military’s relations with the media. An opening came when an NBC 
television reporter asked to cover our training. An MTT working in nearby 
San Juan Opico provided the opportunity. The base commander very 
reluctantly agreed to allow NBC to cover our work.  
His reluctance evaporated when he met correspondent Bonnie 
Anderson. Bonnie, a former tennis professional on the Virginia Slims tour, 
was blonde, tall, fit, attractive, and spoke flawless Spanish. The 
Salvadoran base commander was smitten. He personally gave her the 
grand tour and as much time and access as she and her crew wanted. In 
addition to our trainers, Ms. Anderson’s crew filmed the commander’s 
new clinic and focused on a locally developed prosthetic leg they were 
using to outfit maimed soldiers.  
The night the piece aired, the Salvadoran embassy in Washington, 
alerted by the State Department, had their Betamax recorder rolling during 
the NBC Nightly News. When the tape got to San Salvador, the Armed 
Forces were shocked and pleased. Although they repeated mistakes with 
the media, we began to see movement toward a more accommodating 
ESAF. The assistant Chief of Staff was designated as spokesman when 
they decided to give interviews to important journalists. Media access 
improved, especially away from the capital. 
 
Author’s Comment on Colonel Waghelstein’s Account 
 
Colonel Waghelstein did more than accommodate the press. He 
trained them. Most of them were too young for the draft, for Vietnam, and 
knew as much about insurgency and irregular warfare as, to use one of his 
favorite phrases, “a pig knows about Sunday.” Patiently, Waghelstein 
walked the journalists through it: 
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 Most wars ended neither with the government delivering a 
knockout punch to the insurgents nor with a guerrilla takeover. The 
ends of most wars are negotiated.  
 The guerrillas have to be persuaded, almost always militarily, that 
they cannot shoot their way into power. Only then are meaningful 
negotiations and a political solution possible.  
 How do you know who is winning in a war without front lines?  
 Wars like this one are for “sergeants and lieutenants.”  
 The Salvadoran military wanted, but had limited use for, ground 
attack aircraft and almost none for high-speed aircraft, armor, or 
artillery.  
 
This educational effort helped.  
It personalized our military personnel. From these official but 
informal contacts came invitations to social events, embassy-vs.-
journalists softball games, and personal friendships. This was not as hard 
as it might seem. West Point might not be Yale, but our military and 
diplomatic officers are not as different from journalists as some suppose. 
Most came from the broad American middle class and attended the same 
high schools, played on the same sports teams. If you took family portraits 
of the military officers and the journalists right before high school 
graduation, you probably could not tell the future officers from the future 
correspondents. And both groups are bound by patriotism. Military 
officers’ patriotism is on constant display, and their duty to country is a 
sworn obligation. But journalists are patriots, too. Most of the journalists 
who covered El Salvador have seen the world, seen it and examined it—
and they have come home to America. Friendly contacts are actually fairly 
easy if you define patriotism more broadly and give people the benefit of 
the doubt. 
Yes, a handful of journalists regarded playing shortstop in a 
softball games as derogation of the First Amendment; but then again, 
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some official personnel regarded social contact with journalists as akin to 
fraternizing with the enemy. 
 
D. Shaming the Devil 
 
Most of the foreign correspondents in El Salvador were American 
citizens. This gave us an extra duty: The U.S. government, especially the 
State Department, has a positive duty to try to protect American citizens 
abroad. Most of the journalists rightly believed they knew how to take 
care of themselves and that if they got in trouble their news organization 
would help. This was true of the most experienced correspondents 
working for the big news organizations. But greener correspondents or 
those working for smaller and poorer media outlets often needed help, 
especially when they felt threatened by the Salvadoran army. This 
happened a few times a year. The public affairs officer usually let such 
journalists stay at his well-guarded house and had his bodyguard and 
driver take them to the airport so they could leave the country to “cool off” 
for a few days. In one case, it was not the PAO, but the Naval Attaché, a 
Marine lieutenant colonel, who took in a threatened journalist. 
Cordial or formal, the concept that drove relations with the press 
missionwide was straightforward: Tell the truth and shame the devil. 
There was little chance of deceiving anyone making an effort to 
inquire about conditions in El Salvador. During the 1982 elections, the 
Salvadoran government accredited over 1,500 journalists— in a country 
the size of Massachusetts and with a population of 5 million. The press 
was everywhere, and collectively they had cultivated sources throughout 
Central America, including with the FDR and FMLN (with whom they 
sometimes traveled).  
The candor policy meant that when the Salvadoran Armed Forces 
falsely announced that they repulsed a guerrilla attack and inflicted scores 
of casualties, we did not back them up. We did not go out of our way to 
blab it around, but if someone asked us we would tell the truth: “Well, we 
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know nothing of FMLN casualties, but the Army lost 18 killed and 34 
wounded.” 
The tone for this unparalleled official candor was set by 
Ambassador Hinton, who made some of the least diplomatic public 
statements ever by a senior American diplomat, including the following:89 
 
Hinton: “Graduates of the Salvadoran Military Academy get a 
first-rate high-school education.” (1982) 
 
* * * 
 
Joan Didion90: “Did you prevent Roberto D’Aubuisson from 
becoming interim president after his ticket won a plurality in the 
elections?” 
Hinton: “We stopped that one on the one-yard line.” (1982) 
 
* * * 
 
NBC Producer: “When you were ambassador in Zaire, didn’t 
Mobutu declare you persona non grata, expel you from Zaire?” 
Hinton: “Yes.” 
NBC Producer: “Didn’t he say you were planning to assassinate 
him?” 
Hinton: “Yes, he did.” 
NBC Producer: “Well, were you?” 
Hinton: “If I wanted to kill the son-of-a-bitch he would be dead!” 
NBC Producer: “Is that on the record?” 
                                           
89 All these statements were made in the presence of the author. In June 2013, 
Ambassador Hinton confirmed his statements. 
90 Writing for the New York Review of Books 
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Hinton: “Damned right it is, ‘If I wanted to kill the son-of-a-bitch, 
he’d be dead!’” (1982) 
 
* * * 
 
Christopher Dickey91: “Why do you spend so much time with the 
press?” 
Hinton: “I want to be sure our story gets told, told to everyone. Do 
you know how hard it is to get a piece of paper onto the president’s 
desk? He gets a press briefing before he gets his intelligence 
briefing.” (1983) 
 
Gob-smack candor became a hallmark of the entire embassy.  
Formal, written mission press guidance was issued by the Public 
Affairs Officer in the summer of 1983. The guidance began: 
 
Ambassador Hinton’s policy on dealing with the press is quite 
clear: Any member of the mission may speak to the press, but no 
member of the mission is obliged to speak to the press. 
 The benefits of such a policy are manifest—a better 
understanding of mission activities and policies is in the best 
interest of the U.S. Government and the U.S. public. 
 
This mission guidance contained caveats about following the 
instructions of one’s supervisor, how to avoid having words put in one’s 
mouth, and being careful to confine remarks to one’s own area of 
knowledge or expertise. It concluded:  
 
The vast majority of journalists with whom we deal are 
responsible professionals, doing their best to report a difficult and 
                                           
91 Then with The Washington Post 
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confusing story at considerable personal risk. Many of these 
reporters are more knowledgeable about developments in the 
region than most Foreign Service personnel. We want to help 
journalists and others understand what is happening here, but we 
do not owe any journalist a juicy quote or a voyeur’s peek at 
policy formulation. 
 
After Ambassador Hinton left, Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering 
was similarly candid (though less colorful in his language). Waghelstein’s 
successors as MILGRP commander continued the weekly briefings and 
the pattern of candor. 
In time, this institutional candor paid off.  
Truth was not easy to find in El Salvador. For all its improvements, 
the ESAF never took onboard the idea that candid descriptions of setbacks 
would help in the long run.92 The FMLN had Radio Venceremos, a 
clandestine station that offered the news with classic communist 
flamboyance, distortions, exaggerations, and outright lies. The human 
rights office of the archdiocese was constantly ready to accept FMLN 
versions over those of the Army. This led to several odd outcomes, but we 
in the embassy came to know one of them very well. 
In a meeting with Ambassador Pickering, Aryeh Neier, then head 
of the human rights group Americas Watch, recommended that the 
embassy give more weight to the numbers from the Church’s human rights 
office. According to Neier, all of that Church office’s numbers were 
supported by eyewitness testimony. Ambassador Pickering took Neier up 
on his suggestion. The embassy human rights officer examined their 
                                           
92 One commander, a lieutenant colonel, in charge of the Armed Forces Press Committee 
(known by its Spanish acronym COPREFA) told the embassy PAO, who had urged more 
candor: “We have lied so much for so long that if we suddenly step up and say, ‘We 
suffered 32 casualties today,’ people with think it is really 3,200. We have trained them 
to believe that everything is worse than we say.” 
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records and found several discrepancies in their records and an interesting 
example.  
When the FMLN overran an important Salvadoran Army garrison 
in Sensuntepeque, the Army lost several killed, wounded, and missing. 
The Army was not known to have inflicted any casualties. To save face, 
the ESAF announced that they had killed some 200 attackers. The 
Church’s human rights office records showed that the army had murdered 
some 200 unarmed civilians at that place and time—so much for 
eyewitness accounts.93 
In a world where no one could count on the government, the 
guerrillas, or even the Church for facts, the embassy emerged as the most 
reliable source of information. Skeptics and opponents of U.S. policy 
knew we did not tell them all we knew. They knew we had a viewpoint, 
but they could not afford to accept anyone’s assertions without checking 
with us. The cumulative effort was of vast importance. It gave us two 
things seldom obtained: (1) knowledge of developing stories, and (2) a 
chance to tell our side of the story.  
This trust had huge value over time, and it was not that hard to 
obtain. We had to set aside preconceptions about the media. We had to 
accept that a few reporters and news organizations were a lost cause; they 
hated the policy and were out to demonstrate that it was wrong. We had to 
work hard to acknowledge the flaws of our Salvadoran counterparts yet 
not paint the policy goals as hopeless. The very hardest thing to do was to 
avoid comment on some of the profoundly stupid things U.S. politicians of 
the left and right sometimes said. 
                                           
93 On the whole, the Roman Catholic Church in El Salvador played a salutatory role 
during the Civil War. Archbishop Romero had been confrontational, but his successor 
Archbishop Rivera y Damas was less so. Although the Church’s human rights office, 
Tutela Legal, was regularly manipulated by the FMLN, it was more straightforward than 
its predecessor, which Archbishop Rivera y Damas abolished for its flagrant bias toward 
the FMLN. 
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There was another element to the media piece: All sides were 
trying to turn the media to their advantage. The FMLN allowed media to 
join them in their camps and sometimes on their movements. The FMLN 
treated visiting journalists well, although they were severe with 
unexpected visitors, fearing penetration attempts. Even then, they did not 
harm them, but kept them isolated until their bona fides as journalists 
could be verified.  
The embassy tried to use the media, too, making every reasonable 
effort to get our story told. Once again, Colonel Waghelstein tells the 
story: 
 
We wanted to highlight the work of Colonel Sigifredo 
Ochoa, commander in Cabañas. He was by far the most effective 
Departmental Commander at the time. His counterinsurgency 
methods were worthy of cloning and included widespread civic 
action, extensive civilian–military cooperation, and effective 
intelligence operations. We knew the Salvadoran military followed 
themselves in the U.S. press. If Ochoa came off well, his 
colleagues might try to emulate him. 
We got a press visit to Cabañas set up. Before they left, I 
briefed them on things to look for and questions that would 
demonstrate their grasp of counter-insurgency MOE. They 
returned from the trip suitably impressed.  
At the other end of the spectrum was the Usulután 
Department Commander, who should have been replaced long ago. 
We encouraged the press to go to Usulután and (if they could find 
the commander sober and vertical) they could ask him the same set 
of questions they had asked Colonel Ochoa. The press came 
through with some embarrassing coverage and there was a change 
of command in Usulután.  
 
The worst at dealing with journalists was COPREFA (Comité de 
Prensa de las Fuersas Armadas, or Press Committee of the Armed Forces). 
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This official media source for the Salvadoran military was originally 
staffed by a pair of alcoholic officers. The international press referred to 
them as “bottle caps”—either on the bottle or on the floor. Their alcohol 
problems were the least of it.  
When a photo in the New York Times miscaptioned Salvadoran 
soldiers as guerrillas, they called the embassy public affairs officer over to 
give some advice: “What can we do about this disinformation? This makes 
the guerrillas look as well-equipped as we are. How can we punish the 
photographer?” 
The PAO responded, “It is a mistake, not disinformation. The 
photographer does not write the caption. I would let it go, but if you want 
to do something, write a letter to the New York Times ridiculing them for 
their error. The Times will hate that. They take themselves very seriously.” 
No one wrote a letter to the Times. The next night, persons never 
officially identified broke into the photographer’s apartment while he was 
not at home. The intruders assaulted his Salvadoran girlfriend and trashed 
the apartment.  
The Salvadoran military and security forces relied almost wholly 
on intimidation and, on at least one occasion, murder. It is almost certain 
that the Salvadoran Army tricked four Dutch journalists into thinking they 
were being led to a rendezvous with the FMLN. They were actually being 
led into an “ambush” in which they were “accidentally” killed by the 
Army.94 It seems likely this was intended to prevent other journalists from 
attempting to travel with the FMLN. 
                                           
94 The official version of the journalists’ death was that they had been stuck by rounds 
from Army machine gun fire from a distance of at least a hundred meters—far enough 
that it was not possible to determine that their cameras were not weapons and that their 
appearance was nothing like that of the typical Salvadoran. In 1982, the author discussed 
the matter with MILGRP officers who had seen the bodies. They said that they, who had 
all seen combat in Vietnam, did not see how the Salvadoran Army’s version could be true. 
The dead had been hit too many times in the torso. According to these American officers, 
someone hit in the torso from a hundred meters or more usually goes down immediately 
and is hardly ever hit more than twice.  
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Most of the Salvadoran press was of little moment. There was 
almost no substantive political or military coverage in Salvadoran press by 
1982, and several journalists had been murdered. The last element of what 
might be described as an opposition paper had been bombed out in 1980. 
Salvadoran television literally carried no news programs until about 1986, 
when a new station opened. The two leading papers sent no 
correspondents to cover the war. Nor did the papers publish hard news 
items not derived from press releases. The Miami-dwelling publisher of 
the reactionary El Diario de Hoy reviewed every word of the first 12 
pages via computer and modem (which was very advanced for the early 
1980s). Salvadoran radio was vibrant and active, on the other hand, and 
was the primary information source for most Salvadorans. 
Over the years, embassy relations with the media, even those 
skeptical of U.S. policy, were handled with great civility. Even when the 
disagreements became pointed, voices were seldom raised.  
 
E. Crossing Swords 
 
Of course there were exceptions. 
Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, famously even-tempered and 
widely regarded as the most accomplished American diplomat of his 
generation,95 gave an early 1984 interview to Christian Science Monitor 
Central America correspondent Dennis Volman. During the interview, 
                                           
95 Pickering came to El Salvador having already served as executive secretary of the State 
Department, ambassador to Nigeria, and ambassador to Jordan. He left El Salvador to 
become ambassador to Israel. Later on, he was ambassador to India, to the United 
Nations (during the first Gulf War), and to Russia. He ended his State Department career 
as under secretary for political affairs, the number-three position in the State Department. 
After retiring, he became senior vice president for international affairs for Boeing, where 
he was deeply involved in multiple Boeing/Airbus issues. In 2012, he and former 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen chaired the State Department’s 
Accountability Review Board that examined the death of U.S. Ambassador Christopher 
Stevens in Benghazi, Libya. 
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Volman said that the embassy’s deputy chief of mission had cavalierly 
endangered the life of the Monitor’s resident correspondent, Christopher 
Hedges. Ambassador Pickering said that his deputy had done nothing 
more than send a clipping of a Monitor article written by Hedges. Volman 
said that he believed that neither the ambassador nor the mission as a 
whole had a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of Salvadoran society 
to understand that sending a clipping might be seen by the recipient (who 
was the Salvadoran colonel commanding the National Police) as an 
“signal” that Hedges should be “taken care of.” 
Ambassador Pickering did not raise his voice, but interrupted 
Volman to ask, “Are you speaking for the Christian Science Monitor or 
for yourself?” 
Long pause. 
“For the Monitor,” answered Volman. 
“I do not believe you. I will be in Boston96 next week and I will 
make a point of seeing Charlotte Sakowski97 to verify that you are 
speaking for the Monitor.” 
That ended the interview.98 Volman continued as Central America 
bureau chief, but never again asked a question or sought an interview with 
anyone at the embassy in San Salvador. 
 
F. Helping Out 
 
On Saturday, March 26, 1983, Col. Waghelstein and PAO Don 
Hamilton were having coffee on the back terrace of the PAO’s residence 
when the phone rang. 
The caller was Joan Ambrose-Newton, BBC radio correspondent 
and a legal, permanent U.S. resident. The Treasury Police were at her 
                                           
96 Home of the Christian Science Monitor. 
97 Executive editor of the Monitor. 
98 The author was present during the interview. 
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home, arresting her and another U.S. reporter, T.J. Western. They would 
not tell her why but said they were taking them to jail at Treasury Police 
headquarters. No, neither of them had been hurt or roughed up. Yes, they 
said they were Treasury Police, but only one showed an ID. It was 
expired. 
“I’m on my way,” said the PAO. The colonel and the PAO took 
the PAO’s light-armored vehicle and headed for Treasury Police HQ. Both 
knew the Treasury Police’s reputation.  
 All uniformed Salvadoran personnel—Army, Navy, Air Forces, 
National Guard, Police, Treasury Police, even the fire department—were 
led by graduates of the Salvadoran Military School. They sometimes 
moved from service to service during the course of a career. All these 
organizations (except the fire department) had a terrible reputation for 
human rights abuses, but the Treasury Police had the worst reputation of 
all. They were said to have “arrested” hundreds, maybe thousands, but to 
hold few prisoners.  
Neither Hamilton nor Waghelstein had ever been to Treasury 
Police headquarters. Strictly speaking, both were veering outside the scope 
of their duties by going to the Treasury Police. Protection of U.S. citizens 
is the work of the consular section of the embassy. Such liaison as the 
embassy maintained with law enforcement agencies was conducted either 
by the Defense Attachés or (for matters relating to the protection of the 
embassy) by the State Department’s Regional Security Office. Thus, the 
PAO had never had occasion to visit any police headquarters, and U.S. 
law forbade the MILGRP Commander to offer equipment, training, or 
counsel to a law enforcement agency.99 He had never exchanged more 
than pleasantries with Treasury Police officers.  
They were mindful of their departure from established norms and 
while en route each radioed the the Marine on Post One in the embassy 
                                           
99 This prohibition originated some years before, when police organizations in several 
countries had been involved in wretched human rights abuses. 
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with a request that the Marine notify others. Their choice not to wait make 
to the calls themselves was deliberate: They did not wait because they did 
not trust the Treasury Police. Yes, the Treasury Police had acted with 
unusual deference by permitting Ms. Ambrose-Newton to call an embassy 
official. That was encouraging, but Salvadoran military and security 
personnel had acted with brazen brutality in the past. Both men considered 
it important to put official American eyes on the arrested reporters to 
establish beyond doubt that both were alive and unharmed before they 
went into Treasury Police cells. 
Delay at Treasury Police headquarters occasioned but a phone call 
from the gate. A U.S. Embassy first secretary and a colonel in the U.S. 
Army (out of uniform) had come to visit two reporters who had been 
arrested.  
When their vehicle arrived at the main building, Treasury Police 
Commander Colonel Nicolás Carranza and two other Salvadoran men 
were waiting. Carranza, tall, thin, and greying, was immediately 
recognizable. One of the other men wore the uniform and rank of a 
Salvadoran major. The third man was in civilian clothes but had a Colt M-
1911 A-1 pistol, cocked and locked, stuck in the center of his belt in front. 
Carranza was polite but aloof. The man in civilian clothes scowled and 
made no secret of his anger at the presence of the Americans. 
Col. Carranza politely but without warmth asked Colonel 
Waghelstein, “What brings you to our headquarters today?” 
The American colonel, mindful of the strictures under which he 
operated, introduced himself and directed the question to Hamilton. 
“We have come to inquire into the matter of the arrested reporters. 
We want to know the charges and to meet with them to inquire as to their 
treatment.” 
The man in civilian clothes was not having a bit of it.  
“They are detained on matters related to the internal security of El 
Salvador. This is not a matter of concern to the embassy.” 
Hamilton came back levelly, “Almost every nation, including the 
Republic of El Salvador and the United States of America, have signed a 
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treaty promising to facilitate inquiries concerning the welfare and 
whereabouts of their countries’ citizens when those citizens are in the 
territory of another signatory.”  
He was hoping no one would raise the fact that Ms. Ambrose-
Newton was a South African citizen. U.S. consular access rights might not 
extend to residents who are not citizens. He did not know where the 
nearest South African consulate might be, but he was confident it was not 
close. Nor did he believe, in those days of apartheid, that they would be 
anxious to jump to the defense of a “colored” South African. 
Postures and voice tones were getting stiff between Hamilton and 
the man in civilian attire. Carranza stepped in, keeping his tone even. 
“Why does the American embassy want to check on these people? Surely 
you do not believe anything would befall them while they are with us?” 
The PAO guessed that Carranza was trying to calm things without 
appearing to undercut his subordinate. 
“Well, my colonel,” he replied. “According to one of the reporters, 
none of the men making the arrest was in uniform, and only one had 
identification and it was expired. We merely wish to be certain that they 
are securely in the hands of the Treasury Police. I am sure you know that 
people pretending to be Treasury Police have committed lamentable acts.” 
Pointed though the exchange had been, things were now calmer. In 
the meantime, the Naval Attaché, Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel 
Phillip Ray, who was well known to the Treasury Police, and the Vice 
Consul in charge of U.S. citizen services had arrived.100 
Further introductions were in order and pleasantries of a sort were 
exchanged. After several minutes, all the parties came to an agreement: 
Ms. Ambrose-Newton was to be released to the custody of Lt. Col. Ray. 
                                           
100 The attachés played an interesting role throughout. By definition, their primary duty 
was to gather and report information on the host country military. And because they did 
not offer military assistance, they were not banned from dealing with local law 
enforcement. The Defense Attaché’s office assigned the Treasury Police to the naval 
attaché, who was always a Marine. 
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She would live in his house and could leave only to go to the homes or 
offices of other official Americans. Mr. Western would remain in custody, 
but consular officials could visit him at any time. 
This situation continued for a few weeks. Eventually, Mr. Western 
was released to the custody of his congressman, James Oberstar of 
Wisconsin, who escorted him from the country. Cynics within the 
embassy suggested that the ambassador had asked the Salvadorans to 
release the prisoner to Oberstar as a means of winning his support for the 
administration’s Salvador policy.101 At the same time, Ms. Ambrose-
Newton was released from the benign custody of the Naval Attaché and 
left the country. She later returned to El Salvador, where she worked 
without incident for over a year.  
This small episode illustrates not just mission efforts to be friendly 
and helpful to the media, but also the high degree of coordination and 
cooperation within the embassy family. This kind of deliberate, thoughtful 
departure from assigned lanes helped make the entire mission function 
more smoothly. 
 
G. The Guest House 
 
The problems of Western and Ambrose-Newton were far from the 
only ones faced by American reporters and news agencies. From 1982 to 
the fall of 1986, the embassy public affairs officer freely offered the 
protection of his diplomatic status to any journalist who sought it.102 
Because his official residence, purely by coincidence, had a separate 
guesthouse, this was not a significant sacrifice. The PAO guesthouse 
provided temporary shelter to journalists from Newsweek, Reuters, UPI, 
AP, the Guardian, and several other news organizations. 
                                           
101 Ambassador Hinton denies he did this. 
102 A 1986 earthquake made the embassy chancery uninhabitable and moved press 
operations to the residence of the public affairs officer.  
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H. Graciousness from a Pillar of American Socialism 
 
On the eve of the 1985 municipal and legislative elections in El 
Salvador, a group of Americans strongly opposed to U.S. support for the 
(by then) constitutionally elected government got themselves accredited as 
election observers, with help from the U.S. embassy. They asked the 
embassy for a briefing, and Ambassador Pickering invited them to his 
residence to get an informal brief from the principal team members.103  
The group was emphatically not persuaded by the country team 
arguments to the effect that the government was legitimate, that the 
elections were honest, and that human rights abuses were down 
dramatically from a few years before. Even so, the activists were mostly 
polite and attentive—mostly.  
As Defense Attaché Colonel L.C. “Chan” Duryea was describing 
the Salvadoran military, a woman of perhaps 50 rose to her feet and began 
to speak with trembling and almost tear-filled voice: “I am a New England 
Quaker and I cannot believe what I am hearing here. I do not believe what 
you people are saying. You are covering up for murder! And when I look 
at you, Colonel, with your short hair …”  
She stopped for breath. 
Almost immediately, 70-year-old Bayard Rustin,104 who had 
organized Martin Luther King, Jr’s. famous 1963 March on Washington, 
stood and, leaning on his cane, spoke in a quiet, steady voice, “I am a New 
York Quaker. In our congregation we do not disparage people. Not for the 
color of their skin; not for their grooming standards. Colonel, I ask you to 
believe that Quakers do not condemn anyone for their appearance.” 
Rustin went on to thank the embassy staff for efforts to provide 
them our view of the circumstances. His quiet dignity and gentle rebuke 
                                           
103 The author was present at this briefing. 
104 Rustin was African-American. 
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deflated the self-righteous among his companions and effectively closed 
the briefing. 
Military or civilian personnel assigned to execute controversial 
policy should expect at least verbal abuse and negative stereotyping from 
those opposing the policy. On the bright side, even those clearly on the 
other side of the issue can be gracious.  
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IX. Leverage? What Leverage? 
 
By 1984, the U.S. was giving the Salvadoran government $1.5 
million daily, two-thirds as economic assistance; the rest was military. 
That should have given the embassy enormous leverage. It 
sometimes seemed to. Salvadoran politicians and military personnel would 
devote endless hours talking to U.S. congressmen, administration officials, 
and so on. They would offer flawless talking points fine-tuned to resonate 
in American ears. The military renounced any claim to direct political 
power. 
But there was one thing the Salvadoran military would not give 
up—their impunity from criminal prosecution. Scores of thousands of 
people were killed through El Salvador’s civil war. Most of them were 
murdered—not killed in combat, but murdered. Although the FMLN and 
its predecessors did plenty of killing outside combat, there is no real doubt 
that military and other security forces were responsible for an 
overwhelming majority of the murders. 
Even with constant pressure from the United States to hold 
individuals accountable for their criminal acts, those who sought judicial 
process and punishment were terribly disappointed by the results. Even in 
the highest-profile murders, justice could not be wrung from the officer 
corps, as the following examples show:  
 
 Charges were never brought in the murders of the FDR 
(democratic socialist) leaders. 
 The murder of the American nuns brought jail for the junior 
enlisted men involved. These men were pardoned in the general amnesty 
of 1993. In spite of profound suspicions that the enlisted men would not 
have done this on their own, no one up the chain was ever seriously 
investigated. 
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 There was never a Salvadoran investigation into the murder 
of American journalist John Sullivan. One legislator from the far-right 
ARENA party tried to prevent a forensic examination of the remains. 
 The Sheraton case, where many details are known, may be 
the most frustrating: 
o The Salvadoran Supreme Court justice who appointed the 
investigating magistrate was the uncle of one of the prime 
suspects, Captain Ernesto Ávila.  
o Lt. López Sibrián went for a lineup in full dress uniform 
with his hat on, his very distinctive bright red hair dyed 
black, and his mustache shaved off. He had not been in 
uniform the night of the murders.  
o Sheraton Hotel owner Ricardo Sol Mesa told hotel staff 
members they might “end up under the hotel” if they 
testified. 
o Hans Christ, who fingered the victims, was arrested but 
released for lack of evidence. 
o Major Denis Morán, who was with all the other suspects 
except the triggermen, was never charged. 
o The two triggermen were jailed until released by a general 
amnesty in 1993.  
o Lt. López Sibrián was never held accountable for the 
Sheraton murders. The military did permit the criminal 
justice system to jail him for several years for participating 
in a kidnapping-for-profit ring. That group, pretending to 
be FMLN guerrillas, kidnapped wealthy and powerful 
Salvadorans. The wealth and power of the Salvadoran 
victims may have brought him down. U.S. power, leverage, 
and influence certainly did not. 
 Only two people, Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides 
and Lieutenant Yuhssy René Mendoza, were convicted for the Jesuit 
murders. They were released in the 1993 amnesty after serving two years. 
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Over the course of more than a decade, hundreds of military and 
diplomatic officers attempted to bring justice and democracy to El 
Salvador.  
They succeeded in bringing democracy. 
But when the war ended, the Salvadoran officer corps had 
maintained their solidarity and their impunity to punishment. That 
solidarity in the face of so much pressure is perversely impressive. With 
the military and security forces responsible for thousands of murders, 
perhaps a dozen enlisted men and a handful of officers were imprisoned—
none for more than 12 years.  
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X. Final Issues for Discussion 
 
These are the personal thoughts and cautions of the author, who 
makes no claim of omniscience.  
Did the United States “win” in El Salvador?  
We aligned with a flawed, beleaguered government and prevented 
a takeover by forces hostile to the United States. For the first time since 
the 1950s,105 we confronted armed forces supported by communists from 
around the world and denied them a victory. We said we wanted honest 
elections with participation by all parties, and honest elections took place. 
For the past 30 years, electoral results have been honored by all parties. 
Thus, we can fairly be said to have done our part to help bring 
about democracy in a country that had never seen it. That must count as a 
victory. 
But it is a victory with an asterisk. Could we have gone the 
distance had the Soviet Union not collapsed? There is certainly reason to 
raise the question. Few of the injustices that drove the insurgency were 
ended. The military’s impunity was merely scratched.  
To this day, millions of people in the United States and around the 
world equate our involvement in El Salvador as a blot on our national 
copybook. The misdeeds of the Salvadoran military are well known and 
documented.  
The FMLN got away more or less clean. The U.S. government 
carefully documented and demonstrated that the FMLN was getting its M-
16s from Vietnam and not capturing them from the Salvadoran military, as 
the FMLN claimed. When getting ammunition for M-16s became too hard, 
the FMLN switched to AK-47s, which the Salvadoran military never had 
from any source. Even so, any search on Google of the subject of arms 
smuggling turns up a nearly solid wall of articles all but denying 
communist arms supplies. No one mentions that the FMLN press-ganged 
                                           
105 Except for the invasion of Grenada. 
HAMILTON: EL SALVADOR IN THE 1980s 
 
106 
 
young teens to fill the ranks. No one remembers that the FMLN celebrated 
the deaths of the “war criminals” aboard the space shuttle Challenger106 or, 
in at least one little-known case, that the FMLN murdered Salvadoran 
soldiers after they had surrendered.107 At the rate things are going, 
everyone will “know” that the U.S. created and trained the death squads 
we tried so hard to get rid of. 
 
What can we take from the experience in El Salvador and put to 
use? 
 When any president repeatedly insists that a particular 
government must not “fall” because major U.S. national security 
interests are involved, he casts away leverage. The Salvadoran military 
knew that we would not walk away after we linked their success to our 
security. All the arguments that put us into Iraq and Afghanistan might be 
keeping us there with more personnel for longer than we would otherwise 
stay. The U.S. no longer seeks combat in Iraq or Afghanistan, but how 
many troops remain? How long will they stay there? 
 Once we commit to one side, many will hold us 
responsible for all that side does. From murders in El Salvador to opium 
in Afghanistan, we own it all. 
 Money and arms do not buy loyalty. They rent lip 
service. Consider Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, and Egypt. 
                                           
106 The author well recalls that Radio Venceremos, the official voice of the FMLN, on the 
morning after the Challenger blew up on launch, described the entire crew as war 
criminals. 
107 In 1983, an officer from MILGRP photographed the bodies of several Salvadoran 
soldiers. When I personally showed the 8×10 photos to a physician from Amnesty 
International, he told me it was clear that they had all been murdered after they had taken 
off their uniforms. He told me it was easy to determine this because the blood trails on 
their bodies showed they were not clothed (all were wearing underwear). He noted that 
almost all were dead from high-velocity rifle wounds to the head and that the severity of 
the wounds indicated they had been shot from no more than a few feet. We displayed 
these photos to the U.S. press, and no one doubted they had been murdered. Even so, a 
two-hour Internet search in 2014 found no record of this event. 
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 When people complain about human rights abuses, we 
should listen carefully. This does not mean that we should blacklist 
countries willy-nilly, but we need to pay attention. The Reagan 
administration spent millions of dollars and wasted significant prestige in 
El Salvador before recognizing that right-wing violence was feeding the 
insurgency. 
 We tend to believe people who parrot our talking 
points—especially if they speak English. President Karzai speaks 
beautiful English and 10 years ago spoke glowingly of democracy. Ahmed 
Chalabi, an Iraqi exile who had spent most of his life in London and the 
U.S., was a strong advocate for U.S. intervention. He proved very 
persuasive in Washington before the war in Iraq started and during the 
occupation. Iraqis give him significant recognition, but almost no support. 
 T. E. Lawrence was right about eating soup with a knife. 
It is sloppy when you force host country personnel to undertake difficult 
and unfamiliar tasks, but worth it. Such success as we achieved in El 
Salvador came about because the political situation in the U.S. would not 
permit us to send hundreds or even thousands of trainers and advisers.  
 Treat training a foreign army with skepticism. How 
much training does an army need? We recruited, trained, equipped, 
deployed, and demobilized roughly 10 million men and women between 
1939 and 1945. We have been training Iraqi and Afghan soldiers longer 
than that.  
 Most importantly, understand that you are unlikely to 
find a fair, just, and benevolent government beset by an insurgency. 
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